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NOTES
BASELESS PLEAS: A MOCKERY OF JUSTICE
Mari Byrne*
This Note addresses the ethicality of the baseless plea, a guilty plea
entered by a defendant for a crime that everyone in the courtroom-judge,
prosecutor, defense attorney, and defendant-knows the defendant did not
commit. Used in the interest of efficiency and leniency, the baseless plea
allows a defendant to plead guilty to a crime that has no basis in the facts
of the case. Though used by courts in numerous jurisdictions, baseless
pleas have been largely unaddressed as courts have sought to conceal the
practice and as commentators have therefore failed to detect it. This Note
seeks to remedy that omission by shedding light on baseless pleas and the
ethical concerns this practice raises. This Note begins by describing
baseless pleas, both the context in which, and the reasons for which, they
are used. Next, this Note reviews the ethical duties of prosecutors, defense
attorneys, and judges as they relate to baseless pleas. Then, this Note
surveys the limited body of commentary on this practice, which consists of
criminal justice policy and legal ethics arguments made by courts and
commentators in support of and in opposition to, these pleas. Ultimately,
this Note concludes that regardless of the justifications offered in support of
this practice, including the interest in efficiency, prosecutors and judges
cannot participate in baseless pleas because the practice defies their ethical
responsibilities to uphold the integrity of the court and legal profession and
to ensure the fairness of the criminal process. This Note ends with a
proposal to clarify the ethical prohibition against baseless pleas by
amending legal ethics rules to clarify prosecutors' probable cause
obligation and by installing prosecutorial and judicial policies that bar
prosecutors and judges from participating in baseless pleas.
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, Fordham University School of Law; M.A. Candidate, 2011,
Fordham University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences; M.S.W., 2008, Columbia
University School of Social Work; B.S., 2007, George Mason University. I would like to
thank Professor Bruce Green for his wisdom and encouragement and my husband Paul for
his constant support.
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INTRODUCTION
If you looked at Jewell C. Walker's rap sheet, you would think he was a
frugal music lover who pirated a few too many songs.' He pled guilty to
making 1000 illegal recordings of music without consent-and without ever
recording a song.2 "In a legally sanctioned game of courtroom make-
believe, Walker avoided a potentially hefty jail term for robbery by instead
accepting responsibility for a separate crime that never occurred."'3 Walker
was arrested for violently robbing a man on the street, but when the victim
was unwilling to cooperate for trial, the prosecutors had to bargain if they
were going to get a conviction.4 Walker was unwilling to accept a plea
with jail time, and his previous rape conviction would demand incarceration
if he pled to a theft charge, so the prosecutors got creative. 5 With the
judge's approval, in order to get Walker's guilty plea, the prosecutors
allowed Walker to plead to illegally recording music, a crime everyone in
the courtroom knew hc did not commit. 6
1. See Thomas Clouse, Man Admits Bogus Crime: Creative Plea Settles Robbery Case,
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Although Walker's case is among the more bizarre, state courts across
the country enter similar plea bargains everyday-plea bargains to crimes
that never happened. 7  In certain jurisdictions, courts, especially those
dealing with misdemeanors, allow defendants to enter guilty pleas for
charges that are not supported by the facts because they want to avoid trials
and get convictions. 8 Everyone connected to these cases knows that there is
no factual basis for the pleas entered, but no one argues because everyone is
benefitting: the judge and prosecutor save time and resources, 9 the defense
attorney strikes a good deal for her client, 10 the defendant enjoys a lenient
sentence,11 and everyone avoids litigation. 12  "In the words of one
municipal court clerk, 'Everybody likes a bargain:""'13
In some courts, allowing defendants to plead guilty to charges that are
unsupported by fact is a common practice. 14 Supporters of the practice
have accepted it as a "time-honored"' 15 custom or a "necessary evil"'16 that
allows defendants to benefit from lenient punishment while courts benefit
from the efficient disposal of cases. 17 However, some authorities have
begun to recognize problems with this practice, arguing that, although
factually baseless pleas may benefit those involved in an individual case,
"self-interest does not necessarily coincide with justice."' 8
7. See infra notes 35-39.
8. See infra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
9. See James Aheam, No Compromise When It Comes to Traffic Violations, RECORD
(Bergen County, N.J.), May 24, 2000, at L9 (stating that by entering baseless plea bargains,
"[p]rosecutors don't have to spend the better part of an hour trying a case .... [and
m]unicipal judges can turn their attention to more important matters").
10. See, e.g., Matt Campbell, KC Reverses Plea-Bargain Policy: The City Council
Votes To Reinstate a System That Allows Motorists To Get Speeding Tickets Reduced, KAN.
CITY STAR, Sept. 8, 2006, at Al (describing how defense attorneys in Kansas City had
pressed the city council to allow plea bargains to defective equipment instead of the moving
violations for which defendants were initially charged).
11. See Tom Hester, Municipal Courts Told: End Deals on Tickets, Critics of State
Mandate Fear Back Log of Traffic Disputes, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Apr. 30, 2000, at
I ("The [defendant] motorists are happy because they've reduced their fines or limited
damage to their driving records.").
12. See id. (describing the benefit to all the parties involved in a baseless plea of
avoiding litigation).
13. Jennifer V. Hughes & Dan Kraut, A Bargain That Can't Be Driven Anymore:
Judges Apply Brakes to No-Point Tickets, RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Apr. 30, 2000, at
A l (quoting a municipal court clerk in New Jersey).
14. Statute 215 "goes back years as a way to keep court cases moving" by allowing
defendants to plead guilty to failing to obey directional signals despite having committed
other more serious offenses. Id.; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-215 (West 2009).
15. Hester, supra note 11.
16. Clouse, supra note 1.
17. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
18. Ahearn, supra note 9 (arguing that "if you are arrested for speeding or careless
driving you ought to be prosecuted for that offense" because "[i]f the Legislature believes
present penalties are excessive, it can reduce them").
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To date, although arguments have been made in support of, and in
opposition to, the use of baseless pleas, 19 considerations of judicial and
prosecutorial ethics have not been thoroughly addressed in assessing the
legitimacy of this questionable practice. This Note seeks to remedy that
omission by analyzing baseless pleas through the ethical lens to provide
insight as to why this practice has gone largely unaddressed, what
implications this practice has on legal ethics and the integrity of the
criminal process, and how court officers should respond to baseless pleas to
protect the integrity of the criminal justice system. Accordingly, Part I.A. 1
of this Note introduces the practice of baseless plea bargaining by providing
a definition of the practice and comparing baseless pleas to pleas that are
supported by fact. Part I.A.2 then describes the various benefits of baseless
plea bargains, benefits that serve to illustrate why the practice is used in
some jurisdictions without debate. Part I.B describes the ethical duties of
the prosecutor, defense attorney, and judge relevant to an analysis of the
ethicality of baseless pleas. First, Part I.B. 1 describes the responsibilities of
the prosecutor, as minister of justice, to bring charges supported by
probable cause, to uphold candor toward the tribunal and third parties, and
to avoid wrongful convictions. Next, Part I.B.2 explains the duty of
defense counsel, as the zealous advocate, to obtain the best result for her
client while maintaining her duty of candor. Finally, Part I.B.3 discusses
the obligations of the judge, as overseer of the administration of justice, to
uphold the integrity of the judiciary, to regulate the bar, and to ensure the
fairness of criminal proceedings.
Part II of this Note describes the opposing views on baseless pleas,
explaining both the ethical and criminal justice policy justifications put
forth in support of, and in opposition to, the practice. Part II.A examines
claims by supporters of baseless pleas who argue that the practice is
justified because the defendant pleading to the factually baseless charge is
guilty of a crime, even if unrelated; the interest in judicial efficiency
outweighs the need for a factual basis; and the baseless plea provides a
mutually beneficial resolution that supersedes the factual basis requirement.
Next, Part II.B describes criminal justice policy and legal ethics arguments
made by critics of baseless pleas who find that this practice weakens
deterrence, threatens public safety, violates prosecutors' probable cause
obligation, and threatens the integrity of the courts.
Finally, Part III of this Note assesses the debate over baseless pleas in
light of court officers' ethical obligations, particularly those of prosecutors
and judges. It argues that, regardless of the criminal justice policy
arguments used to justify the practice, prosecutors and judges cannot
ethically participate in baseless pleas because the practice defies their
responsibility to uphold the integrity of the court and legal profession and to
ensure the fairness of the criminal process. Part III concludes with a
19. This Note uses the term "baseless plea" to refer to the discussed practice. A more
thorough definition is provided in Part I.A.1.a.
2010] 2965
FORDHAMLAW REVIEW
proposal to clarify the ethical prohibition against baseless pleas by
amending legal ethics rules to clarify the probable cause requirement for
prosecutors and by installing prosecutorial and judicial policies that bar
prosecutors and judges from participating in baseless plea bargains.
I. BASELESS PLEAS: THE PRACTICE AND RELEVANT ETHICAL DUTIES
A. The Practice of "Baseless Pleas"
Part L.A begins by explaining the practice of baseless pleas, first defining
baseless pleas and describing the context in which they occur, and then
comparing baseless pleas to guilty pleas that are supported by a factual
basis. This section continues by describing the benefits of baseless pleas to
the various participants in criminal cases, which serve to explain the
popularity and largely undisputed use of this practice.
1. An Explanation of Baseless Pleas
a. The Definition and Context of Baseless Pleas
A "baseless plea" is a guilty plea,20 a factual admission of the elements
of a crime,2 1 or a plea of nolo contendere,22 an "admission of guilt for the
purposes of the case," 23 entered by a defendant for an offense that the
defendant did not commit, and that all the parties in the case know the
defendant did not commit.24 Instead of pleading to a more serious crime
that the prosecutor thinks the defendant actually did commit, 25 the
20. See People v. Keizer, 790 N.E.2d 1149, 1151-52 (N.Y. 2003) (holding that a
defendant could plead guilty to a baseless offense).
21. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (citing DONALD J.
NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 23
(1966)).
22. See People v. West, 477 P.2d 409, 419-20 (Cal. 1970) (holding that a defendant
could plead nolo contendere to a baseless offense).
23. Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451, 455 (1926); Fortson v. Hopper, 247 S.E.2d
875, 876-77 (Ga. 1978) (stating that a plea of nolo contendere is "an assertion by the
defendant that he does not desire to contest the truth of the charges against him"). Note that
"by pleading nolo ... the defendant has made no statement at all of what the facts actually
are," so despite making an admission of guilt for purposes of the case, the defendant is not
making a factual admission as in a guilty plea. Patrick W. Healey, Note, The Nature and
Consequences of the Plea ofNolo Contendere, 33 NEB. L. REV. 428, 431, 433-34 (1954).
24. See West, 477 P.2d at 419-20 (affirming the conviction of a defendant who pled
guilty to selling narcotics even though the trial court knew there was no factual basis to
support the charge); Iowa Supreme Court Att'y Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360,
367 (Iowa 2005) (describing how a city prosecutor filed 174 baseless charges with the
approval of police officers, defendants, and the magistrate judge, all of whom knew there
was no factual basis for the charges).
25. See, e.g., Clouse, supra note 1; see also supra text accompanying notes 1-6
(describing how prosecutors allowed a defendant who they had reason to believe committed
robbery to plead to illegally downloading music).
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defendant is permitted, pursuant to a plea bargain, 26 to plead guilty to an
offense that is unrelated to the facts of the case.27 Note that baseless pleas
are distinguished from "fictional pleas," a situation in which a defendant is
allowed to plead guilty to a crime that does not exist by criminal statute. 28
Additionally, baseless pleas do not arise in the context of Alford pleas-
guilty pleas coupled with claims of innocence-because judges are
explicitly prohibited from accepting Alford pleas "until they have
established that factual bases ... exist for the pleas that resolve the conflict
between the waiver of trial and the claim of innocence." 29
In a typical baseless plea, the defendant is brought into the justice system
with probable cause for the offense initially alleged. 30 In order to obtain an
expedient conviction and avoid expending effort to resolve issues related to
insufficient or inadmissible evidence, uncooperative witnesses, or
defendants who are unwilling to plead to the original charges, 31 the
prosecutor offers the defendant the option to plead guilty to a less serious,
unrelated offense that is unsupported by the facts of the defendant's case.
Note that a less serious offense charged in a baseless plea where "the lesser
crime does not logically compose a part of the greater" 32 is distinguishable
from a lesser-included offense, which is an offense "'necessarily included
in the offense charged"' 33 and supported by a factual basis.34  Despite
26. A plea bargain is an exchange of concessions from the state for the defendant's
guilty plea, which includes a waiver of the right to trial. See JAMES E. BOND, PLEA
BARGAINING AND GUILTY PLEAS §§ 1.1, 1.7 (2d ed. 1982).
27. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
28. See People v. Stephenson, 30 P.3d 715, 716-17 (Colo. App. 2000) (holding that a
defendant could not be convicted of "attempted felony murder" pursuant to a plea agreement
because "attempted felony murder" was not recognized as a statutory offense in Colorado
and noting that "the power to define crimes and prescribe punishments is vested exclusively
in the General Assembly and may not be usurped by courts"). For further background on the
separation of powers as it relates to criminal law and, correspondingly, baseless pleas, see
U.S. CONST. arts. 1-111; Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (describing the
United States' tripartite system of government and the constitutionally delineated functions
of each branch); Robert J. Punshaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-
Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393 (1996) (explaining the separation of powers
doctrine within the context of judicial decision making); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing
After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries, " and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992)
(describing the relationship between the three branches).
29. Curtis J. Shipley, The Alford Plea: A Necessary but Unpredictable Tool for the
Criminal Defendant, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1063, 1066 (1987) (explaining that "[c]ourts must
establish factual bases for such pleas from evidence outside of the statements of the
accused"). See generally North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
30. See Ahearn, supra note 9 (explaining how defendants are typically cited for conduct
constituting speeding or other moving violations); Clouse, supra note 1 (describing how a
defendant was originally arrested for robbery for attacking and taking $306 from the victim).
31. See, e.g., Ahearn, supra note 9 (describing how baseless pleas benefit parties by
avoiding litigation); Clouse, supra note 1 (describing how a baseless plea was used because
the witness refused to testify, the evidence was insufficient without the witness' testimony,
and the defendant was unwilling to plead to an offense that would result in jail time).
32. People v. West, 477 P.2d 409, 420 (Cal. 1970).
33. Berra v. United States, 351 U.S. 131, 134 n.4 (1956) (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 31 (c))
(holding that defendants may be found guilty of lesser-included offenses).
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knowing that the offense being pleaded to has no factual basis, the judge,
prosecutor, and defense counsel allow the defendant's guilty plea.35 A
Kansas City reporter described the process of how a defendant pleads guilty
to an offense with no factual basis, such as defective equipment, 36 which is
common in Missouri:
Let's say you're driving 60 mph in a 45 mph zone. Police ticket you for
speeding. If you just pay the ticket, it will cost you about $100. You will
also get 2 points on your driving record. And if you're a really bad driver,
that might be enough points to lose your license.
But if you hire an attorney, he can ask the city prosecutor to amend your
ticket to a defective equipment plea, similar to if you had a broken
taillight. If the prosecutor agrees, you will pay about $160 for the
defective-equipment citation and $100 to $200 for the attorney .... But
you won't get any points on your driving record, you won't lose your
license and you will avoid a potential increase in your insurance rates. 37
The types of offenses charged in baseless pleas vary from defective cowl
lamps 38 to disorderly conduct,39 and a given court or jurisdiction that allows
this practice often h as a certain offense that is routinely used as a baseless
plea.40 Some jurisdictions, however, allow baseless pleas to any offense, 41
as long as the defendant had sufficient notice of the charge.42
34. "When it is impossible to commit a particular crime without concomitantly
committing, by the same conduct, another offense of lesser grade or degree, the latter is, with
respect to the former, a 'lesser included offense."' N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 1.20 (McKinney
2003) (providing as an example that "[i]n any case in which it is legally possible to attempt
to commit a crime, an attempt to commit such crime constitutes a lesser included offense").
35. See, e.g., West, 477 P.2d at 411, 419 (holding that "[tihe court may accept a
bargained plea of guilty or nolo contendere to any lesser offense reasonably related to the
offense charged in the accusatory pleading" even if there is no factual basis for the actual
offense pled); People v. Keizer, 790 N.E.2d 1149, 1152 n.2 (N.Y. 2003) (affirming a
defendant's conviction made pursuant to a baseless plea and stating that "a defendant may
plead guilty to a crime for which there is no factual basis and even plead guilty to a
hypothetical crime" (citing People v. Francis, 341 N.E.2d 540 (N.Y. 1975))).
36. "[A] defective equipment plea [is] similar to if you had a broken taillight." Michael
Mansur, A Defective System Gives Speeders a Pass, KAN. CITY STAR, Jan. 29, 2006, at Al.
37. Id.
38. See Iowa Supreme Court Att'y Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360, 367
(Iowa 2005) (describing how city prosecutor, Bradley Howe, effectively moved the court to
amend 174 citations that originally charged violations of city traffic laws to allege violations
of the cowl-lamp statute).
39. See Keizer, 790 N.E.2d at 1150-51 (describing a baseless plea to disorderly conduct
when the defendant was originally accused of petit larceny and criminal possession of stolen
property).
40. See, e.g., Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator:
A Systemic Approach, 2 CLINICAL L. REv. 73, 105 n.l 19 (1995) (describing how
prosecutors' offices typically have "standard deals" that "may be contained in written
guidelines formulated by those in charge of the prosecutor's office or based on unwritten
practices developed over time and passed on to newer members of the office"); Hughes &
Kraut, supra note 13 (reporting that the "sweetheart deal" in New Jersey traffic courts
allowed defendants accused of various moving violations to plead to an "unrelated statute,
known as '215'); Mansur, supra note 36 (describing how "the Municipal Court repeatedly
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b. Baseless Pleas Compared with Factually Based Pleas
Although baseless pleas have not received significant attention, the
resolution of criminal cases by voluntary guilty plea is well-known, and, in
fact, the majority of cases are resolved by plea bargain. 43 Guilty pleas,
factual admissions "of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, '4 4 are
typically made pursuant to plea bargains, an exchange of concessions from
the state for the defendant's guilty plea.4 5 Plea bargaining "dominates the
day-to-day operation of the American criminal justice system."'46 The
practice is widely used 47 and constitutionally legitimate 4 8 despite its
imperfections.4 9 The Supreme Court, while recognizing plea bargains as
"inherent in the criminal law and its administration, '50 has held that
because guilty pleas are admissions of criminal charges and waivers of
allows thousands of speeders and red-light runners to reduce dangerous moving violations to
defective-equipment pleas").
41. See People v. West, 477 P.2d 409, 410-11, 419-20 (Cal. 1970) (allowing defendant
Dale Irven West, who was originally charged with possession of marijuana under section
11530 of the Health and Safety Code, to plead nolo contendere to a violation of "opening or
maintaining a place for the selling, giving away, or using of a narcotic" under section 11557
because "[t]he court may accept a bargained plea of guilty or nolo contendere to any lesser
offense reasonably related to the offense charged in the accusatory pleading" (citing CAL.
HEALTH& SAFETY CODE §§ 11530, 11557)).
42. Id. at 419-20 (holding that a defendant can plead to a baseless charge as long as the
"accusatory pleading adequately notifies the defendant that the People will seek to prove the
elements of a lesser offense" (citing People v. Marshall, 309 P.2d 456,462-63 (Cal. 1957))).
43. See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 1
(1979) [hereinafter Alschuler, Plea Bargaining] (describing how the majority of cases are
resolved through guilty pleas and these are most likely obtained through plea bargaining).
44. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (citing NEWMAN, supra note
21, at 23).
45. See West, 477 P.2d at 413 (stating that the "great majority" of criminal cases are
disposed of through plea bargaining).
46. Michael M. O'Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REv. 407,
409 (2008).
47. See George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 1012-13 (2000)
(noting that "guilty-plea rates above ninety or even ninety-five percent are common");
O'Hear, supra note 46, at 409 (reporting that roughly ninety-five percent of criminal cases
are resolved by plea bargains); accord Marshall J. Hartman & Marianna Koval, The
Immorality of Plea Bargaining, in LEGALITY, MORALITY, AND ETHICS 1N CRIMINAL JUSTICE
-7A 70, 80 icholas N. Kittie & Jackwell Susman eds., 1979) ("[P]iea bargaining ... is
probably the key mechanism by which the criminal justice system in this country operates
today.").
48. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 27-29 & 28 n.2 (1970) (emphasizing the
constitutionality of plea bargains); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970)
(upholding plea bargaining).
49. See, e.g., Alschuler, Plea Bargaining, supra note 43, at 1-3 (stating that, although
the historical justifications for plea bargaining are inaccurate, the practice has become an
institution within the criminal justice system).
50. Brady, 397 U.S. at 751; see also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971)
(stating that plea bargaining is "an essential component of the administration of justice," and
"[p]roperly administered, it is to be encouraged" in the interest of judicial efficiency).
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certain constitutional rights, guilty pleas made via plea bargains must be
entered voluntarily and knowingly.51
The first constitutional requirement for a guilty plea, and thus for a
baseless guilty plea, is voluntariness, which is "determined only by
considering all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it," 52 and is
presumed if the plea is negotiated without "actual or threatened physical
harm, mental coercion overbearing the defendant's will, or the defendant's
sheer inability to weigh her options rationally. '53  In light of the
circumstances surrounding the typical baseless plea, in which the defendant
benefits from a charge to a lesser offense and therefore a lesser penalty and
in which she pleads without evidence of coercion or harm by the
prosecutor, baseless pleas are generally assumed to be entered voluntarily. 54
The second constitutional requirement that pleas be entered knowingly is
fulfilled where the defendant is advised by competent counsel, is aware of
the nature of the charge against her, and does not exhibit incompetence. 55
Defendants who enter baseless pleas for the most part have the advice of
counsel and fulfill the requirements described, so baseless pleas are
likewise assumed to be entered knowingly. 56
Beyond the due process requirements that ensure the admission of guilt
and waiver of constitutional rights are knowing and voluntary, our highest
Court has explained that "because a guilty plea is an admission of all the
elements of a formal criminal charge .... [a guilty plea also] requires the
judge to satisfy himself that there is a factual basis for the plea." 57  In
making this inquiry, judges must assure that "there is sufficient evidence
51. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5 (1969) ("'A defendant who enters such a
plea simultaneously waives several constitutional rights, including his privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his right to confront his
accusers.... [So] if a defendant's guilty plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has
been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void."' (quoting McCarthy v.
United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969))); accord Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
52. Brady, 397 U.S. at 749.
53. Dawn Reddy, Guilty Pleas and Practice, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1117, 1119-21
(1993) (describing the requirements of a voluntary and knowing plea).
54. See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Court Att'y Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360,
367 (Iowa 2005) (explaining that baseless cowl-lamp pleas were typically sought by
defendants to avoid points on their licenses); Clouse, supra note 1 (reporting that prosecutors
offered to negotiate a baseless plea because the defendant was unwilling to plead to the
factually supported theft charge); Mansur, supra note 36 (describing how defendants seek
baseless pleas).
55. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 756 (describing the requirements of a knowing plea). Federal
courts disagree on whether a defendant can voluntarily plead guilty without consulting an
attorney. Compare United States v. Loughery, 908 F.2d 1014, 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(holding that the decision to plead can be made only after consulting with an attorney
providing effective counsel), with United States v. Pregler, 925 F.2d 268, 269 (8th Cir. 1991)
(stating that a lack of counsel when defendant entered a plea agreement was not sufficient
grounds for setting aside a knowing and voluntary plea).
56. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 10 (describing how defense attorneys are involved in
arranging baseless plea bargains); Mansur, supra note 36 (explaining that a defendant can
get a baseless plea if he hires an attorney).
57. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466-67 (1969).
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upon which the defendant could be convicted if he or she elected to stand
trial."'58 This factual basis requirement is reflected by Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states, "Before entering
judgment on a guilty plea, the court must determine that there is a factual
basis for the plea." 59 Evidence of this factual basis is often provided solely
by the defendant's own admission of guilt in court.60
However, "[t]he procedure prescribed by Rule 11 is not the constitutional
minimum required for a knowing and voluntary plea; it merely constitutes
the procedure for federal courts. Thus, Rule 1 1 is not binding on the
states," 61 and a guilty plea is constitutionally valid in state courts as long as
the plea is deemed to have been entered voluntarily and knowingly. 62
Although only bound by the constitutional standard, numerous state courts
have adopted procedures similar to those of Rule 11,63 including the
requirement of a factual basis.64
2. Why Baseless Pleas Are Used
"Properly administered, [plea bargains] can benefit all concerned, '65 and,
in the same way, properly administered, baseless pleas benefit all
concerned. The following description of the numerous benefits of baseless
pleas to the various participants in criminal cases explains the appeal and
largely undisputed use of this practice and also demonstrates why baseless
pleas are sought and encouraged.
58. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY Standard 14-1.6 cmt., at
65 (3d ed. 1999) (citing Godwin v. United States, 687 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1982)).
59. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 l(b)(3).
60. See Iowa Supreme Court Att'y Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360, 371
(Iowa 2005) ("Oftentimes in a plea bargaining situation, probable cause will be supplied by
the defendant's admission."); Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty
Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 968-76 (1989) (describing how the defendant's
confession takes the place of trial evidence in a plea bargain).
61. Gaddy v. Linahan, 780 F.2d 935, 943 n.8 (lth Cir. 1986) (citing Frank v.
Blackburn, 646 F.2d 873, 882 (5th Cir. 1980)); see also Smith v. Scully, 614 F. Supp. 1265,
1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("[The] requirement that federal judges satisfy themselves that there is
a factual basis for the plea is [not] a statutory restatement of a constitutional requirement.").
62. See Gaddy, 780 F.2d at 943 n.8 ("[A] 'wide range of constitutional plea procedures
[are] available to the state courts."' (quoting Frank, 646 F.2d at 882)); Ames v. N.Y. State
Div. of Parole, 772 F.2d 13, 15 (2d Cir. 1985) ("The State court's inquiry did not have to be
patterned after Fed.R.Crim.P. 11.").
63. See BOND, supra note 26, § 3.6(a) (explaining that states are free to use less stringent
procedures than Rule 11 to determine the voluntariness and intelligence of pleas but that
many have enacted procedural rules similar to Rule 11).
64. See Purvis v. Connell, 182 S.E.2d 892, 894 (Ga. 1971) ("It is clear from the majority
Boykin opinion and also from its dissenting opinion that a state trial judge, in accepting a
plea of guilty, now has the same duty in this respect that a federal trial judge has under Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure."); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PLEAS OF GUILTY Standard 14-1.6(a), at 64, 66-68 (3d ed. 1999) (advising all courts to make
an inquiry into the factual basis for guilty and nolo pleas). But see Stepp v. State, 686
S.W.2d 279, 280 (Tex. App. 1985) ("Texas courts are not bound to follow Federal Rule 11."
(citing Joseph v. State, 614 S.W.2d 164, 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981))).
65. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).
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There are several ways in which baseless pleas benefit prosecutors. First,
they give prosecutors incredible flexibility and discretion in resolving their
cases.66  Using the bargaining system, prosecutors are able to
''maximize ... the number of convictions" and also have discretion to do
the "'right thing' for the defendant in view of the defendant's social
circumstances or in view of the peculiar circumstances of his crime. '67
Second, prosecutors often operate with limited resources, and plea
bargaining provides a prompt and efficient method of managing an
overwhelming caseload within those limitations.68 By plea bargaining,
"prosecutors conserve vital and scarce resources" '69 because they can
"dispose of each case in the fastest, most efficient manner in the interest of
getting [their] and the court's work done."'70 Especially where prosecutors
have overwhelming numbers of similarly situated, seemingly minor cases,
baseless pleas provide a quick and efficient resolution,71 allowing
prosecutors to focus their litigation efforts on more critical cases. 72 Third,
in cases with procedural problems, like suppressed evidence or
uncooperative witnesses, baseless pleas allow prosecutors to obtain a
conviction where they are unlikely to do so successfully at trial. 73
"[D]efense attorneys have powerful incentives to avoid trial, even when a
trial would be in the client's interest" and therefore benefit similarly from
baseless pleas. 74 A large portion of defendants are indigent and "nearly all
of [indigent defense attorneys] work for a flat fee paid in advance," so it is
in defense attorneys' financial interest to avoid the time and effort of trial.75
Defense attorneys, who often practice with scarce resources, benefit from
the quick disposition of cases, 76 and with a baseless plea bargain, they "can
66. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L.
REv. 50, 52-53 (1968) [hereinafter Alschuler, Prosecutor's Role].
67. Id.
68. See Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 71 (describing how prosecutors must conserve
resources); Alschuler, Prosecutor's Role, supra note 66, at 56 (recounting prosecutors'
overburdened caseload).
69. Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 71.
70. Alschuler, Prosecutor's Role, supra note 66, at 52.
71. See Mansur, supra note 36 (describing how municipal court prosecutors quickly
dispose of thousands of minor traffic violations by using baseless defective equipment
pleas).
72. See Ahearn, supra note 9 (describing and criticizing how prosecutors can focus their
attention to more pressing matters by entering baseless pleas in minor cases).
73. See Alschuler, Prosecutor's Role, supra note 66, at 60 (stating that in making
convictions, prosecutors insist that "'[h]alf a loaf is better than none"'); Clouse, supra note 1
(describing how a baseless plea was used when the victim was unwilling to cooperate).
74. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1988
(1992).
75. Id.
76. See Fisher, supra note 47, at 1063 (stating that public defenders' heavy caseloads
create an incentive to plea bargain as a way to efficiently dispose of cases); David J.
Richards, Note, The Public Defender Defendant: A Model Statutory Approach to Public
Defender Malpractice Liability, 29 VAL. U. L. REv. 511, 538 (1994) (reporting that as
attorney caseloads increase, so do the use of guilty pleas). See generally Albert W.
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collect a fee for a routine procedure." 77 Additionally, many jurisdictions
impose caps on compensation for the representation of indigent clients, and
if these capped amounts are inadequate for the time and expense of bringing
a case to trial, 78 then a baseless plea provides a sufficient compromise for
an attorney to adequately represent her client while supporting herself.79 In
addition, a defense attorney's goal is to obtain the best result for her
client, 80 and baseless pleas significantly benefit the defendant. 81
The benefit for defendants in entering baseless pleas is straightforward:
defendants receive more lenient sentences and less serious charges in
exchange for pleading guilty and avoiding trial. 82 Despite losing the
opportunity for acquittal and waiving their right to a jury trial, defendants
escape potentially harsher penalties, 83 a record with more serious charges,84
and "the anxieties and uncertainties of a trial." 85
The judiciary also benefits from baseless pleas because the speedy
disposition of cases conserves already limited judicial resources.86 Baseless
pleas alleviate congested caseloads and reduce expenses by avoiding jury
trials.87 As Chief Justice Warren E. Burger observed,
The consequence of what might seem on its face a small percentage
change in the rate of guilty pleas can be tremendous. A reduction from 90
per cent to 80 per cent in guilty pleas requires the assignment of twice the
judicial manpower and facilities .... A reduction to 70 per cent trebles
this demand.88
By entering baseless pleas, judges "'are still getting some accountability no
matter what it's called,"' 89 and avoiding the burden of time and resource-
consuming trials.90
Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1206-55
(1975) [hereinafter Alschuler, Defense Attorney's Role].
77. Ahearn, supra note 9.
78. See Mackenzie v. Hillsborough County, 288 So. 2d 200, 200-02 (Fla. 1973)
(upholding $750 fee for over 500 hours reasonably spent defending a capital case); Huskey
v. State, 688 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tenn. 1985) (upholding a $500 fee for 181.3 hours
reasonably spent in noncapital felony-murder trial).
79. See Michael Mansur, Ticket Deals Go Beyond Speeding, KAN. CITY STAR, Mar. 12,
2006, at Al (reporting defense attorneys' opposition to a ban on baseless pleas because it
would cause them to lose fees).
80. See infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 11, 26 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Clouse, supra note 1 (explaining that a defendant avoided jail time by
entering a baseless plea).
84. See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Court Att'y Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360,
367 n.2 (Iowa 2005) (describing how a defendant originally charged with theft was allowed
to plead to a violation of the cowl-lamp statute).
85. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).
86. See id.
87. See Warren Burger, The State of the Judiciary-1970, 56 A.B.A. J. 929, 931 (1970).
88. Id.
89. Clouse, supra note 1 (quoting the presiding judge who entered the baseless plea for
Jewell C. Walker).
90. See Hester, supra note 11.
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Perhaps less apparently, baseless pleas "may be mercy not only for the
accused but also for the accuser." 9 1 When the defendant's criminal act has
a direct victim, the victim may benefit from a baseless plea, which allows
the victim to gain an immediate sense of closure by knowing the defendant
will not go unpunished and to avoid the rigors of testifying at trial. 92
Additionally, baseless pleas foreclose the possibility of an acquittal, which
would leave the victim without any form of retribution. 93
The public also derives benefits from having cases resolved by baseless
pleas rather than litigation. 94 The public forfeits the cost of the criminal
justice system-the judges, the prosecutors, and the public defense
attorneys-so the quicker and more efficient the resolution of cases, the
more the public saves. 95  In fact, it is often argued that the "[plea
bargaining] system reflects the likely results of the trial system, but at a
lower cost."
'96
B. Ethical Duties Relevant to Baseless Pleas
Part L.A illuminated the practice of baseless pleas by defining the
practice, discussing the context in which it occurs, comparing the practice
to factually based guilty pleas, and describing the benefits derived from
baseless pleas that explain their prevalent and accepted use. This section
discusses the ethical duties of prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges
relevant to baseless pleas. Beyond the constitutional requirements for a
valid plea as discussed in Part I.A, there are "difference[s] between what is
ethically required and what is constitutionally required of an attorney." 97
First, this section discusses the responsibilities of the prosecutor, as minister
of justice, to bring charges supported by probable cause, to act with candor
91. Carolyn E. Demarest, Letter to the Editor, Plea Bargaining Can Often Protect the
Victim, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1994, at A30.
92. See Clouse, supra note 1 (reporting how prosecutors convicted a defendant without
the testimony of the victim, who refused to testify); Demarest, supra note 91 ("Often a crime
victim is very young or elderly, or otherwise infirm and does not want to be subjected to the
rigors of trial, to have to relive in the presence of the accused the detailed horrors of
victimization.").
93. See Demarest, supra note 91 (stating that "[i]n [weak] cases a plea will insure a
conviction where a trial may result in acquittal").
94. Id. ("[T]he public is ill served by perpetuation of the myth that plea bargaining is a
copout by the criminal justice system .... Apart from the simple reality of too many cases
for the limited resources available, there are substantial benefits to be derived from plea
bargaining that better serve the community than taking every case to trial.").
95. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
96. Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1121, 1136-
37 (1998) (describing the "Just Result" theories that serve as justifications for plea
bargaining). For discussion of arguments against plea bargaining, see Donald G. Gifford,
Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U.
ILL. L. REv. 37 (arguing that most plea bargains are unconscionable because they are a
product of unequal bargaining power); David Lynch, The Impropriety of Plea Agreements:
A Tale of Two Counties, 19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 115 (1994) (arguing for reduced reliance
on plea bargaining).
97. JOHN M. BURKOFF, CRIMINAL DEFENSE ETHICS: LAW AND LIABILITY § 5:5, at 5-26
to -27 (rev. ed. 2000) (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983)).
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toward the tribunal and third parties, and to avoid wrongful convictions.
Next, this section explains the ethical duty of defense counsel, as zealous
advocate, to obtain the best result for her client, the defendant, while
maintaining candor to the court and third parties. Lastly, this section
discusses the ethical obligations of the judge, as the overseer of the
administration of justice, to uphold the integrity of the court, properly
regulate the bar, and assure the fairness of criminal proceedings.
1. The Prosecutor's Ethical Duties as Minister of Justice
The prosecutor's duty in our criminal justice system is to "seek justice" 98
on behalf of the people.99 As minister of justice,' 00 the prosecutor's
"interest ... in a criminal prosecution is not that [she] shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done," 101 and as the representative of the people, she is
obliged to uphold a higher ethical standard than required of other
lawyers.' 0 2 For a prosecutor to behave otherwise "not only undermines the
public trust, but inflicts damage beyond calculation to our system of
justice" 10 3 and to the public's confidence in the legal profession. 10 4 Thus,
to maintain the public's trust in the justice system and in the integrity of the
legal profession, prosecutors must strictly adhere to their ethical
obligations, which in the context of baseless pleas require that prosecutors
bring charges supported by probable cause, act with candor toward the
tribunal and third parties, and avoid wrongful convictions. 105
a. Bring Charges Supported by Probable Cause
Prosecutors, governed by rules of professional responsibility, 10 6 have an
ethical obligation to bring charges against a defendant only where the
98. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1980); ABA STANDARDS
RELATING TO THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION Standard
1.1(c) (1974).
99. See Hosford v. State, 525 So. 2d 789, 793 (Miss. 1988) (stating that the prosecutor's
"'paramount obligation is to the public"' (quoting People v. Zimmer, 414 N.E.2d 705, 707
(N.Y. 1980))).
100. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. (2009).
101. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
102. See People v. Kelley, 142 Cal. Rptr. 457, 466-67 (Ct. App. 1977) (describing the
"additional standards of conduct" that apply to prosecutors as representatives of the people).
103. In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 480 (D.N.M. 1992).
104. See AM. BAR ASS'N, COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, ".... IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC
SERVICE:" A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM, at vii (1986)
("The citizens of this country should expect no less than the highest degree of
professionalism when they have entrusted administration of the rule of law-one of the
fundamental tenets upon which our society is based-to the legal profession.").
105. See infra Part I.B.l.a-c.
106. See generally Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a History of the Legalization of
American Legal Ethics-I The Modern Era, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205 (2002); Charles
W. Wolfram, Toward a History of the Legalization of American Legal Ethics-I. Origins, 8
U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 469 (2001) (describing the creation of ethical rules,
promulgated by the American Bar Association and adopted by courts, that attorneys must
follow to avoid discipline).
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prosecutor knows the charge is supported by probable cause 10 7 because a
prosecutor must be dedicated to "the ascertainment of the true facts
surrounding the commission of the crime."108  "[I]t is unprofessional
conduct for a prosecutor to recommend an indictment on less than probable
cause"10 9 or to continue an action when there is no probable cause. " 0 The
requirement of probable cause is embodied in Model Rule 3.8(a), 111 a
provision in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct" l2 that has been
enacted in most jurisdictions] 13 and ensures that prosecutors have a
"'reasonable ground for supposing that a criminal charge is well-
founded."'14 A prosecutor, therefore, cannot bring charges or seek charges
greater in number or degree than she can reasonably support with evidence
at trial"15 because in order to afford defendants procedural justice,
prosecutors must assure that "guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient
evidence."116
The probable cause requirement is the widely accepted prosecutorial
standard for charging a criminal defendant, 117 and states that a prosecutor
must "refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not
supported by probable cause." 118 However, probable cause is considered
"the minimum ethical threshold for a prosecutor to charge a defendant
criminally" 119 and has been argued to set "too low an ethical floor."' 120
107. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2009) ("The prosecutor in a criminal
case shall: (a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported
by probable cause .... ).
108. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part).
109. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 791 (1977).
110. See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 469 A.2d 252, 255 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
111. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a).
112. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct are the ethical standards for attorney
conduct published by the American Bar Association that have been formally adopted by all
state courts, with some variations, and therefore generally apply to most lawyers in the
United States. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2009); American Bar Association,
Center for Professional Responsibility, Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Dates of
Adoption, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/alpha-states.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2010)
[hereinafter Dates of Adoption] (reporting the states that have adopted the Model Rules to
date).
113. See NIKI KUCKES, REPORT TO THE ABA COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF THE RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: CONCERNING RULE 3.8 OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY: SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PROSECUTOR 12 (1999) [hereinafter
SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PROSECUTOR] (reporting that at least thirty-three states had
adopted Model Rule 3.8(a) verbatim and a number of others have adopted a variation).
114. Iowa Supreme Court Att'y Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360, 368 (Iowa
2005) (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1806 (unabridged ed.
2002)).
115. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION Standard 3-3.9(f) (3d ed. 1993).
116. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1.
117. See SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PROSECUTOR, supra note 113, at 12; Dates of
Adoption, supra note 112.
118. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a).
119. Niki Kuckes, The State of Rule 3.8: Prosecutorial Ethics Reform Since Ethics 2000,
22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 427, 455 (2009).
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Numerous groups have supported the adoption of a higher standard,' 21 such
as that set forth by the American Bar Association's Criminal Justice
Standards Committee that suggests prosecutors "should not initiate, cause
to be initiated, or permit the continued pendency of criminal charges 'in the




Some jurisdictions, such as the District of Columbia, have adopted this
higher standard, and have made it unethical to file or maintain a charge the
"prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause" or to "prosecute to
trial a charge the prosecutor knows is not supported by evidence sufficient
to establish aprimafacie showing of guilt."'1 23
b. Uphold Candor Toward the Court and Third Parties
As ministers of justice, prosecutors have a "special duty not to impede
the truth"'124 and furthermore to ensure "fundamentally fair trials by seeking
not only to convict, but also to vindicate the truth and to administer
justice."' 25  Lawyers in general have a preeminent obligation to
truthfulness' 26 that prohibits intentionally dishonest conduct, 127 but beyond
this, prosecutors have a unique "legal and ethical duty to truth"'128 and the
responsibility to facilitate the "truth-finding function of the courts." 129 This
duty requires prosecutors to "be forthright, honest, sincere, and
unreserved' 130 toward the court and not to make misrepresentations to third
120. Id. at 454 (referring to Model Rule 3.8(a)).
121. See, e.g., NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS Standard 43.3 (Nat'l Dist. Att'ys Ass'n,
2d ed. 1991) (arguing that a state prosecutor may file "only those charges which he
reasonably believes can be substantiated by admissible evidence at trial"); U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-27.220(A)-(B) (2d ed. 2000) (stating that federal
prosecutors may only initiate prosecution where "admissible evidence will probably be
sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction" and emphasizing that "no prosecution should
be initiated against any person unless the government believes that the person probably will
be found guilty by an unbiased trier of fact").
122. Kuckes, supra note 119, at 455 (quoting ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 3-3.9(a) (3d ed. 1993)).
123. See D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(b)-(c) (2007).
124. United States v. Reyes, 577 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2009).
125. Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 1997).
126. See Att'y Grievance Comm'n v. Guberman, 896 A.2d 337, 340-41 (Md. 2006)
("'[C]andor and truthfulness are two of the most important moral character traits of
a lawyer."' (quoting Att'y Grievance Comm'n v. Myers, 635 A.2d 1315, 1319 (Md. 1994)));
In re Meyerson, 59 A.2d 489, 496 (Md. 1948) ("No 'moral character qualification for Bar
membership' is more important than truthfulness and candor.").
127. See Att'y Grievance Comm'n v. Vanderlinde, 773 A.2d 463, 488 (Md. 2001)
("[I]ntentional dishonest conduct by a lawyer [is] almost beyond excuse.").
128. Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
309, 313 (2001).
129. United States v. Duke, 50 F.3d 571, 578 n.4 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v.
Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333-34 (9th Cir. 1993)).
130. Barbara Hanson Nellermoe & Fidel Rodriguez, Jr., Professional Responsibility and
the Litigator: A Comprehensive Guide to Texas Disciplinary Rules 3.01 Through 4.04, 28
ST. MARY'S L.J. 443, 454 (1997).
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parties,131 including "downstream users"-persons that are not involved in
the current criminal proceeding but who may nonetheless be affected by the
conduct, representations, or decisions from the current proceeding.132
The duty of candor to the court is a foremost ethical obligation 133 that
prohibits prosecutors from knowingly making false statements to the court,
bans submission of false evidence, and requires that prosecutors take
remedial measures to make falsities known to the court. 134  These
prohibitions are necessary if the prosecutor's "truth-seeking function is to
have any meaning"; 135 thus they have been interpreted broadly to apply
even to false statements that "do not go to the heart of the issue being
litigated"'136 and to false evidence with "no bearing on the ultimate
resolution of the matter." 137
In addition to the duty of truthfulness to the court, prosecutors have an
obligation to be truthful to third parties. 138 This prohibits them from
knowingly making false statements of material fact to third parties and also
requires them to disclose material facts to third parties when necessary to
avoid assisting fraud. 139 False statements made in court documents 140 and
misrepresentations in pretrial negotiations' 4' constitute false statements to
third parties within the realm of this ethical obligation, and third parties
include "downstream users." 142
In addition to the duties to avoid deceiving the court and third parties,
prosecutors have a broader obligation to avoid deceptive or fraudulent
131. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2009) (discussing the obligation of
truthfulness in statements to third parties); id. R. 8.4(c) (discussing the obligation to avoid
engaging in deceitful conduct).
132. See N.J. Advisory Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 710 (2006), http://lawlibrary.rutgers.edu/
ethics/acpe/acp710_l.html (stating that a lawyer who deliberately overstates a property's
sales price in a real estate contract violates her ethical obligation not to engage in conduct
intended to defraud third parties, pursuant to Model Rule 4.1, and not to engage in conduct
that is generally deceitful, pursuant to Model Rule 8.4, because it defrauds the future
mortgage loan investor).
133. See CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR ASS'N, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT 315 (4th ed. 1999) [hereinafter ANNOTATED MODEL RULES].
134. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3; Peter R. Jarvis & Bradley F. Tellam,
The Dishonesty Rule-A Rule with a Future, 74 OR. L. REv. 665, 668-75 (1995) (explaining
how the duty of candor applies to private conduct, to speaking as well as failure to speak, to
situations without proof of detrimental reliance on the false statement, and to situations
considered protected by attorney-client privilege).
135. Peter J. Henning, Lawyers, Truth, and Honesty in Representing Clients, 20 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 209, 240 (2006).
136. ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, supra note 133, at 315.
137. Id. at 316.
138. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (discussing the obligation of
truthfulness in statements to others).
139. See id.
140. See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 968 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir. 1992).
141. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-370 (1993)
(forbidding lawyers from deliberately misrepresenting facts to judges in pretrial
negotiations).
142. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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conduct. 143  Despite this, courts have recognized that in exceptional
circumstances, prosecutors, and in some jurisdictions defense attorneys, 144
may be justified in using deceptive methods during criminal proceedings 145
for the purpose of "arriving at the truth[, which] is a fundamental goal of
our legal system."'146 The use of deceptive conduct, such as the "use of an
undercover investigator to detect ongoing violations of the law[,] is not
ethically proscribed, especially where it would be difficult to discover the
violations by other means. ' 147 Though the limits of ethically permitted
deception remain in dispute, 148 deception is recognized as ethical when it
(1) is perpetrated for a compelling reason for which there is no reasonably
available alternative, (2) does not directly benefit the deceiver, (3) is
exposed within a reasonable time after it is perpetrated, and (4) is
perpetrated with the intent of furthering justice. 149
c. Prevent and Rectify Wrongful Convictions
The purpose underlying requirements like probable cause and other truth-
seeking obligations is for prosecutors "to convict the guilty and to make
sure they do not convict the innocent."15 0 Society has a deep-seated interest
143. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4.
144. See, e.g., N.Y. County Lawyers Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 696 at 3 (1993)
(stating that "the rule against secret recordings has been relaxed with respect to prosecutors
and defense counsel involved in criminal investigations"); Colo. Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 112
(2003), http://www.cobar.org/index.cfm/ID/386/sublD/3809/CETH/Ethics-Opinion- 112:-
Surreptitious-Recording-of-Conversations-or-Statements,-07/19/03/ (describing circumstances
in which defense attorneys are permitted to make surreptitious recordings).
145. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 337 (1974)
("There may be extraordinary circumstances in which the Attorney General of the United
States or ... [other] prosecuting attorneys might ethically make and use [deceptive methods
such as] secret recordings if acting within strict statutory limitations conforming to
constitutional requirements."); Colleen E. McCullough, Comment, The Pursuit of a
Prosecutorial Exception: In Re Conduct of Gatti, 27 J. LEGAL PROF. 217, 222-25 (2003)
(describing the use of covert operations by law enforcement officials to expose criminal
conduct and the use of undercover "testers" to expose discriminatory employment or housing
practices).
146. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626-28 (1980) (holding that the government
may use illegally obtained evidence to impeach a defendant's fraudulent statements during
cross-examination for the purpose of seeking justice).
147. Apple Corps. v. Int'l Collectors Soc'y, 15 F. Supp. 2d 456, 475 (D.N.J. 1998).
148. See David B. Isbell & Lucantonio N. Salvi, Ethical Responsibility of Lawyers for
Deception by Undercover Investigators and Discrimination Testers: An Analysis of the
Provisions Prohibiting Misrepresentation Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 8
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 791, 794-95 & n.10 (1995) (explaining that the ethical standard for
covert activities by prosecutors is still unclear).
149. See Christopher J. Shine, Deception and Lawyers: Away from a Dogmatic Principle
and Toward a Moral Understanding of Deception, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 722, 749-50
(1989); see also In re Friedman, 392 N.E.2d 1333, 1337-40 (Ill. 1979) (Underwood, J.,
concurring) (arguing that a prosecutor's deceptive conduct is justifiable if the prosecutor
reasonably believes it is necessary to avoid greater injury such as corruption or bribery, as
long as the court is promptly informed).
150. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part).
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in protecting the innocent from wrongful convictions,1 51 including those
made through plea bargaining, 152 because a justice system that convicts the
innocent, even where defendants voluntarily plead guilty, "exposes the
failure to uphold criminal justice standards upon which society is
constructed."' 153 This interest in protecting the innocent is reflected in the
abundance of safeguards created to prevent and rectify wrongful
convictions, including habeas corpus, innocence legislation, and projects to
overturn wrongful convictions through DNA testing.154
This interest in preventing wrongful convictions is also reflected in the
prosecutor's ethical obligations. The prosecutor's duty to seek justice, and
not merely to convict, means that the prosecutor has a "twofold aim ... that
guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer," so a prosecutor has just as much
a responsibility to protect the innocent as she does to convict the guilty.' 55
Thus, prosecutors' ethics rules command that "special precautions are taken
to prevent and to rectify the conviction of innocent persons."'156 This
requires, for example, that prosecutors inform defense counsel when the
prosecution has evidence that creates a "reasonable likelihood that a
convicted defendant did not commit an offense of which the defendant was
convicted." 157
Such obligations to prevent the unknowing or mistaken conviction of
innocent defendants implies an equally if not more serious obligation to
avert prosecutors from knowingly convicting the innocent. 158 "There is
something profoundly troubling about knowingly facilitating injustice,
more so than inadvertently allowing it to happen. . . . [S]ociety cannot
knowingly facilitate the punishment of those who do not deserve it, even if
151. See Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal
Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361,
1386 (2003).
152. See AM. BAR ASS'N AD Hoc INNOCENCE COMM. To ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF THE
CRIMINAL PROCESS, ACHIEVING JUSTICE: FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE GUILTY
90 (2006) (reporting concern that innocent people are convicted through plea bargains);
Bryan H. Ward, A Plea Best Not Taken: Why Criminal Defendants Should Avoid the Alford
Plea, 68 Mo. L. REV. 913, 916-17 (2003). But see Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156
U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (2008) (arguing that the conventional "innocence problem" with
plea bargaining is largely wrong because innocent defendants are better off with the option
to bargain).
153. F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma M. Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting the
Innocent: The Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB.
L. 189, 197 (2002).
154. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3600 (2006) (codifying the Innocence Protection Act of 2004);
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006) (habeas corpus); Harris v. Blodgett, 853 F. Supp. 1239, 1247 (W.D.
Wash. 1994) (habeas corpus); Innocence Project, Mission Statement,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/Mission-Statement.php (last visited Apr. 19, 2010)
(describing a DNA testing project).
155. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); see Bailey v. Commonwealth, 237
S.W. 415,417 (Ky. 1922).
156. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2009).
157. Id. R. 3.8(g).
158. See Hurd v. People, 25 Mich. 404, 415-16 (1872); Bibas, supra note 151, at 1384
(describing the injustice of knowingly convicting the innocent).
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they agree to it."'1 59 Prosecutors, therefore, who are responsible for seeking
justice, have a grave responsibility to avoid wrongfully convicting
defendants, especially where they know defendants are innocent of the
crimes for which they are being convicted. 160
2. The Defense Counsel's Duty as the Zealous Advocate
The defense attorney's role in the criminal justice system, as the zealous
advocate for her client, 161 is to achieve the best possible result for the
defendant, 162 regardless of the defendant's guilt or innocence. 163 In the
plea bargaining context, therefore, defense counsel has an obligation to seek
a bargain where advantageous to the defendant 164 and to adhere to the
defendant's choice to accept or reject a bargain offered by the prosecutor. 165
Because defense counsel's role is to be a zealous advocate, she does not
have a comparable obligation to the prosecutor to seek justice or ascertain
the truth. 166 At the same time, however, defense counsel's zealousness is
limited by overriding ethical obligations necessary to the criminal justice
process. 167 Regardless of defense counsel's unique position in criminal
proceedings, 168 she has an obligation to carry out the representation of her
client within the bounds of the law and the ethics rules. 169 In the context of
baseless pleas, the relevant bounds of zealous advocacy are the duties of
candor toward the court and truthfulness to third parties, which require that
159. Bibas, supra note 151, at 1384.
160. See Berger, 295 U.S. at 88 ("It is as much [the prosecutor's] duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate
means to bring about a just one.").
161. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-19, 7-23 (1980).
162. See Lindsey v. State, 725 P.2d 649, 660 (Wyo. 1986).
163. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part
and concurring in part).
164. See Strozier v. Hopper, 216 S.E.2d 847, 849-50 (Ga. 1975) ("The most effective
assistance counsel can give may be a well-founded recommendation to plead guilty in
expectation of a lighter sentence."); Steven Zeidman, To Plead or Not To Plead: Effective
Assistance and Client-Centered Counseling, 39 B.C. L. REv. 841, 894 (1998) (suggesting
that defense counsel have a constitutional obligation to persuade their clients to accept
favorable plea bargains).
165. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2009); Alschuler, Defense
Attorney's Role, supra note 76, at 1309.
166. See Wade, 388 U.S. at 256-58 (White, J.. dissenting in part and concurring in part);
Gary Goodpaster, On the Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 118, 123 n.15 (1987).
167. See BURKOFF, supra note 97, § 5:2, at 5-9 to -15 (discussing the bounds of zealous
advocacy); Michael Frisch, Zealousness Run Amok, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1035 (2007).
168. See Wade, 388 U.S. at 256 (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part)
(describing how defense attorneys are assigned a "different mission" than prosecutors).
169. See BURKOFF, supra note 97, § 5:2, at 5-9 to -15; ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-1.2 (3d ed. 1993)
("But included in defense counsel's obligation to the client is the responsibility of furthering
the defendant's interest to the fullest extent that the law and the applicable standards of
professional conduct permit.").
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the defense attorney avoid acting dishonestly and prevent her client from
doing so.170
The duty of candor toward the tribunal applies to all lawyers, "including
defense counsel in criminal cases," and the defense lawyer's role as an
advocate is qualified by her duty of candor to the tribunal. 171 This duty
requires that defense counsel "be scrupulously candid and truthful in
representations of any matter before a court," 172 even to the detriment of the
duties to advocate for the client and maintain client confidences. 173 This
duty to make honest representations to the court through statements or
evidence applies even where the representations neither are material to the
issue being litigated 174 nor influence the ultimate resolution of the case. 175
In addition to the duty of truthfulness to the court, defense counsel has an
obligation to be truthful to third parties, 176 including downstream users. 177
This obligation prohibits defense counsel from knowingly making false
statements of material fact to third parties and also requires them to disclose
material facts to third parties when necessary to avoid assisting the
defendant in committing fraud. 178  False statements made in court
documents, as well as misrepresentations in pretrial negotiations, are
considered false statements to third parties and within the realm of this
ethical obligation. 179
Besides her personal duty to be truthful, the defense attorney has an
ethical responsibility to prevent her client from engaging in fraud, 180 which
includes making false representations to the court, 181 and arguably includes
false admissions of guilt. 182  If defense counsel is unsuccessful in
preventing the defendant from making false representations to the court, she
has an obligation, which relates back to the duty of candor toward the
tribunal, to disclose her client's misrepresentation to the court.1 83
170. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3, 4.1, 8.4.
171. Id. R. 3.3 cmt.
172. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION Standard 4-1.2 (3d ed. 1993).
173. See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, supra note 133, R. 3.3 cmt. 1.
174. See id. at 315.
175. Seeid. at316.
176. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1, 8.4.
177. For a definition of "downstream users," see supra note 132 and accompanying text.
178. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b). Note the duty of candor toward
third parties diverges slightly from the duty of candor toward the tribunal because it is
qualified by the duty of maintaining client confidences. Id.
179. See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 968 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir. 1992)
(holding that a lawyer's submission of fraudulent documents to the court was a false
statement of material fact); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op.
93-370 (1993) (prohibiting lawyers from knowingly misrepresenting facts to judges in
pretrial negotiations).
180. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION Standard 4-3.7(b) (3d ed. 1993).
181. See id.
182. See Alschuler, Defense Attorney's Role, supra note 76, at 1305 & n.342.
183. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 98-412 (1998);
ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, supra note 133, R. 3.3 cmt. 1.
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3. The Judge's Ethical Duties as Administrator of Justice
The judge, as symbol and supervisor of the administration of justice,
which is the foundation of our democratic state, 184 "plays a central role in
preserving the principles of justice and the rule of law."'185 In this role, the
judge's foremost priority is to maintain the integrity of the courts 186 and to
uphold the public's confidence in the legitimacy of the justice system.' 87
To uphold this integrity and confidence, judges have an obligation to
maintain judicial integrity, to properly regulate the conduct of lawyers, and
to ensure the fairness of criminal proceedings.
a. Uphold the Integrity of the Judiciary
The judge's duty to promote the integrity of the courts is "intertwined
with the obligation that judges act at all times in a manner that promotes
public confidence in the [integrity] of the judiciary."' 188 Public confidence
in the judiciary is necessary because "judicial legitimacy represents our
confidence, trust, and belief in the judicial branch of government, which
together provide the main reasons for obeying the law."' 189 If the public
perceives that judges behave with integrity and are worthy of respect, then
the public will obey the law and follow judicial decisions.190 In fact, "[t]he
continuing ability of the courts to function then depends upon public
acceptance of their institutional legitimacy .... Judicial accountability is
absolutely essential to preserving public trust and confidence in our
courts."' 191 Because the judge is invested with the public trust, she must
maintain the highest of ethical standards. 192 To this end, the judge is
required to act according to both the Code of Judicial Ethics, 193 which
184. See In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge re Shenberg, 632 So. 2d 42, 46 (Fla. 1992);
Cone v. Cone, 68 So. 2d 886, 888 (Fla. 1953) ("The administration of justice is the most
important business of the State.").
185. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (2007).
186. See In re Del Rio, 256 N.W.2d 727, 753 (Mich. 1977); Harrison v. Wisdom, 54
Tenn. 99, 111 (1872) ("When once a court has lost the charm of integrity and justice, with
which it should ever be invested, it forfeits its influence for good, and degrades the majesty
of the law.").
187. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl.
188. Russell Engler, Ethics in Transition: Unrepresented Litigants and the Changing
Judicial Role, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 367, 369 (2008); see also In re
Greenberg, 280 A.2d 370, 372 (Pa. 1971).
189. Gregory C. Pingrec, Where Lies the Emperor's Robe? An Inquiry into the Problem
of Judicial Legitimacy, 86 OR. L. REv. 1095, 1104, 1107 (2007); see Alain A. Levasseur,
Legitimacy of Judges, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPPLEMENT 43, 45-50 (2002).
190. See Pingree, supra note 189, at 1107.
191. AM. BAR Ass'N COMM'N ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY 51,
57 (2003).
192. See JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 1.01 (3d ed. 2000)
("Judges are held to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than attorneys or other
persons not invested with the public trust."); Howard T. Markey, A Need for Continuing
Education in Judicial Ethics, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 647, 656 (1994).
193. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2000). Nearly every state has adopted a
form of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. See SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 192, § 1.02.
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primarily governs judges, and the rules of professional responsibility, which
regulate all lawyers. 194 Inevitably, this requires judges to obey the law, 195
including rules of procedure.196
In the plea bargaining context, judges have an obligation to abide by the
criminal procedure rules, and this obligation requires that they ascertain
whether the plea is voluntary, knowing, and, in many jurisdictions, whether
the plea has a factual basis. 197 Where the judge is required by procedural
rules to ascertain the factual basis, although the methods used may vary, 198
a judge "should not enter judgment upon a plea of guilty without making
such an inquiry as will satisfy [her] that there is a factual basis for the
plea."199
In addition to procedural requirements, a judge's ethical obligation to
avoid behavior prejudicial to the administration of justice prohibits her from
deciding cases "by a means other than on the evidence before [her]. '200
The judge's role is "to ascertain whether [her] judgments [are] supported in
law and in fact" 201 such that "'the disposition of cases for reasons other
than an honest appraisal of the facts and the law, as disclosed by the
evidence presented, will amount to conduct prejudicial to the proper
administration of justice.' 20 2 Therefore, both criminal procedure rules and
the ethical codes require that the judge make decisions based on an
appraisal of the facts of a case.
b. Regulate the Bar
A second responsibility judges have in connection with the maintenance
of the integrity of the courts and public confidence in the justice system is
to effectively regulate members of the bar.203  "The admission of an
attorney to the practice of law is a judicial function and it is of necessity
within the inherent power of the court for the reason of self-protection and
194. See In re Callanan, 355 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Mich. 1984); In re Greenberg, 280 A.2d
370, 373 (Pa. 1971) ("If we hold the [lawyer's] profession to a standard so high, can we be
less exacting with respect to judicial conduct?").
195. See Pingree, supra note 189, at 1106-07 ("[T]he judge must comply with the law.").
196. See Tenn. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Vaughn, 595 S.W.2d 62, 63 (Tenn. 1980)
(stating that rules of procedure are "'laws' of this state, in full force and effect").
197. See supra Part I.A. I.b.
198. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
199. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee's notes to 1974 amendments.
200. In re Daniels, 340 So. 2d 301, 302-03 (La. 1976) (holding a judge's conduct
unethical because he decided cases by the flip of a coin instead of on the basis of the
evidence).
201. In re Crutchfield, 223 S.E.2d 822, 826 (N.C. 1975) (sanctioning a judge for not
inquiring into either the factual or legal basis for his decisions).
202. Id. (quoting In re Diener, 304 A.2d 587, 594 (Md. 1973)).
203. See Charles W. Wolfram, Inherent Powers in the Crucible of Lawyer Self-
Protection: Reflections on the LLP Campaign, 39 S. TEX. L. REv. 359, 362 (1998) (stating
that "most state supreme courts also claim the exclusive power to regulate lawyers as the
court sees fit").
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respectability of the profession." 20 4 With the authority to admit attorneys,
the judge has the authority to regulate attorneys 205 and, along with this, the
duty to ensure that attorneys conduct themselves according to ethical
standards. 20 6  In plea bargaining, therefore, although judges cannot
themselves participate in plea negotiations, 20 7  they do have the
responsibility to ensure that the attorneys negotiating pleas to cases in their
courts are doing so in accordance with attorneys' ethical obligations. 208
c. Ensure Fair Criminal Proceedings
Trial judges have a "paramount duty" 209 to both defendants and the
public to ensure fair criminal proceedings. 210 Society has an interest in
"obtaining a fair and accurate resolution of the question of guilt or
innocence" 211 in criminal cases, and public confidence in courts'
resolutions and in the judicial system "depend on full disclosure of all the
facts."212 Judges have a higher obligation than a client's own advocate to
ensure a fair process 213 and are empowered with the discretion to carry out
this obligation.214 Therefore, in plea bargains, although the judge is not
typically encouraged to participate in the plea bargaining process itself,215
she is expected to intervene in criminal proceedings to promote just
determinations216 and ensure convictions are made only where guilt is
established as required by law. 2 17 Therefore, once a plea bargain has been
negotiated and presented to the court, the judge has considerable latitude in
determining whether to accept the bargain and enter a conviction. 218
204. In re Bozarth, 63 P.2d 726, 728 (Okla. 1936).
205. SeeExparte Secombe, 60 U.S. (1 How.) 9, 13 (1856).
206. See In re Lavine, 41 P.2d 161, 162 (Cal. 1935); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHICS 22-33 (1986) (discussing state and federal courts' inherent authority to
regulate attorney ethics).
207. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part 1, 76
COLUM. L. REv. 1059, 1059-60 (1976) [hereinafter Alschuler, Trial Judge's Role]
(describing the trial judge's role in the plea bargaining process as an "independent
examiner").
208. See In re Bozarth, 63 P.2d at 729 ("All members of the bar are officers of the court
and the court must control and assume authority over its officers in the effective
administration ofjustice.").
209. Hoyt v. Lewin, 444 F. Supp. 2d 258, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting Transcript of
Record at 589, People v. Hall, 769 N.Y.S.2d 28 (App. Div. 2003) (No. 10)).
210. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 52 (1932); United States v. Trapneii, 512 F.2d
10, 12 (9th Cir. 1975).
211. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975).
212. Id. at 231 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974)).
213. See Miller v. Drouin, 438 A.2d 863, 864 (Conn. 1981).
214. See McWilliams v. Am. Fid. Co., 102 A.2d 345, 349 (Conn. 1954).
215. See Alschuler, Trial Judge's Role, supra note 207, at 1060.
216. See United States v. Corona, 551 F.2d 1386, 1391 n.5 (5th Cir. 1977).
217. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SPECIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE TRIAL
JUDGE Standard 6-1. l(a) (3d ed. 2000).
218. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(A) (providing that "the court may accept the
agreement, reject it, or defer a decision").
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The power to create and enforce fair procedures to administer justice in
the criminal process stems from a judge's duty to ensure fair criminal
proceedings. 219  The Supreme Court has recognized that "[j]udicial
supervision of the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts
implies the [court's] duty of establishing and maintaining civilized
standards of procedure and evidence. '220 This power to establish standards
of procedure, often called "supervisory powers," is common in state courts
as well.22 1 In the plea bargaining context, these supervisory powers include
the duty to create adequate rules of procedure for the plea bargaining
process 222 and to regulate the conduct of prosecutors, police officers, and
defense attorneys in plea bargaining.223 For example, judges have an
obligation to ensure that plea bargains are not entered pursuant to
misapprehension or coercion 224 and, correspondingly, have created
procedural rules such as Rule 11225 to prevent coercion and assure fairness
in the plea proceeding. 226
II. DEFENSES AND CRITIQUES: THE LEGAL ETHICS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
POLICY ARGUMENTS MADE FOR AND AGAINST BASELESS PLEAS
Despite the various benefits and accepted use of baseless pleas in certain
jurisdictions, some discordant voices have begun to challenge this long-
standing practice and the legitimacy of its continued use. Part II explores
the conflicting views of baseless pleas taken by various commentators-
courts, practitioners, and the media. This part first discusses the criminal
justice policy justifications provided by supporters of baseless pleas and
then the criminal justice policy and legal ethics arguments made by critics
of the practice.
219. See Mary Sue Backus, The Adversary System Is Dead; Long Live the Adversary
System: The Trial Judge as the Great Equalizer in Criminal Trials, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV.
945, 972.
220. McNabb et al. v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-42 (1943); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072(a) (2006).
221. See Jefferey A. Pamess & Amy Leonetti, Expert Opinion Pleading: Any Merit to
Special Certificates of Merit?, 1997 BYU L. REV. 537, 578. See generally Sara Sun Beale,
Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits
on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433 (1984); John Gleeson,
Supervising Criminal Investigations: The Proper Scope of the Supervisory Power of Federal
Judges, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 423 (1997).
222. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1997) ("[T]he law that defines what the criminal
process looks like, the law that defines defendants' rights, is made by judges and Justices.").
223. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors' Ethics,
55 VAND. L. REV. 381, 411-12 (2002).
224. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 136 (1967); supra Part I.A. 1.b.
225. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
226. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee's notes to 1966 amendments.
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A. Defenders of Baseless Pleas Cite Criminal Justice Policy Justifications
Notwithstanding the significant use of baseless pleas by some courts,
legal discourse on the practice is relatively sparse. Still, a few courts and
other commentators have provided justifications in support of the practice.
The New York Court of Appeals has stated that "a defendant may plead
guilty to a crime for which there is no factual basis and even plead guilty to
a hypothetical crime," 227 and the Supreme Court of California has refused
to confine its plea bargains "within the straightjacket" of factually based
offenses.228 The justifications for this approach include the following: (1)
because the client is guilty of some offense, she may plead guilty to any less
serious offense even if unsupported by fact; (2) efficiency supersedes the
need for a factual basis; and (3) baseless pleas provide a mutually beneficial
result that supplants the factual basis requirement.
1. Defendants May Plead to Any Less Serious Offense As Long As the
Facts Support Guilt for Some More Serious Offense
The first justification offered in support of baseless pleas is that
defendants may plead to any less serious offense as long as the facts support
a finding of guilt for some more serious offense. According to this
argument, the probable cause for the original charge provides sufficient
factual basis and adequate notice to the defendant to support the defendant's
baseless guilty plea. In 2005, the Iowa Supreme Court held that baseless
pleas were a violation of a prosecutor's ethical duty to bring charges
supported by probable cause. 229 Judge Jerry L. Larson, a dissenting judge
from this court, however, claimed that the majority, in reprimanding a city
prosecutor for entering baseless cowl-lamp pleas, 230 "confuse[d] the
concepts of probable cause and a factual basis for the guilty pleas" because
only probable cause was needed for a defendant to plead guilty to a charge,
not a factual basis. 231  Judge Larson argued that law enforcement's
"[p]robable cause for the original arrest . . . was required to bring these
traffic offenders into the judicial system .... [and] because probable cause
supported the original charges, it necessarily supports the lesser ones. '232
He also clarified that if the defendant is willing, the defendant may plead
227. People v. Keizer, 790 N.E.2d 1149, 1152 n.2 (N.Y. 2003) (citing People v. Francis,
341 N.E.2d 540, 543-44 (N.Y. 1975)).
228. People v. West, 477 P.2d 409, 421 (Cal. 1970).
229. See Iowa Supreme Court Att'y Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360, 368
(Iowa 2005) (stating that city prosecutor, Bradley Howe, "clearly violated" his ethical
obligation to bring charges only where supported by probable cause by charging defendants
with factually unsupported cowl-lamp violations).
230. A cowl-lamp plea is a guilty plea entered for a violation of the cowl-lamp statute,
which states that "a motor vehicle 'may be equipped with not more than two side cowl or
fender lamps [similar to headlights] which shall emit an amber or white light without glare."'
Id. at 367 (citing IOWA CODE § 321.406 (2008)). However, cowl lamps have not existed on
vehicles "for a considerable number of years." Id.




guilty to any less serious offense, and not necessarily a lesser-included
offense, so long as the original citation for which the defendant is brought
into the justice system is supported by probable cause. 233
The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, positing the same rationale,
explained,
[W]hen a plea is pursuant to a plea bargain, the trial court is not required
to go to the same length to determine whether the facts would support the
charge as it would if there were no plea bargain. This latter rule reflects
the reality that often in the context of a plea bargain, a plea is offered to a
crime that does not closely match the conduct that the factual basis
establishes. . . . [W]e conclude that in a plea bargain context, the
requirements of [the guilty-plea statute] are met if the trial court satisfies
itself that the plea is voluntary and understandingly made and that a
factual basis is shown for.., a more serious charge .... 234
Along similar lines, the Supreme Court of California stated that as long as
the original indictment provides the defendant with sufficient notice of the
type of offense to which she may be offered a plea agreement, there is no
need for a factual basis to support the offense to which the defendant
actually pleads guilty. 235 As long as the facts support a finding that the
defendant committed a criminal offense, she may plead guilty to any less
serious offense.
2. Judicial Efficiency Supersedes the Need for a Factual Basis
Another justification offered in support of baseless pleas is that the
interest in saving judicial resources outweighs the need for a factual basis in
certain cases. The New York Court of Appeals, in allowing a defendant to
plead guilty to disorderly conduct when he stole two books from a Barnes
& Noble in an orderly way,236 emphasized that courts are encouraged to
accept plea bargains to promote policy interests such as saving judicial
resources through avoiding litigation. 237  The court argued that such
interests in efficiency and expediency outweigh the need for a factual basis
in plea bargains, especially for misdemeanors, and therefore justify courts
in accepting baseless pleas. 238
233. Id. at 383-84.
234. State v. Harrell, 513 N.W.2d 676, 680 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Wis. STAT.
§ 971.08; Broadie v. State, 228 N.W.2d 687, 689 (Wis. 1975)).
235. See People v. West, 477 P.2d 409, 420 (Cal. 1970).
236. People v. Keizer, 790 N.E.2d 1149, 1150 (N.Y. 2003). The defendant, Morgan
Keizer, was charged with a misdemeanor for petit larceny and criminal possession of stolen
property for allegedly attempting to leave a Barnes & Noble with books he had not
purchased, but at arraignment, Keizer pled guilty to disorderly conduct in exchange for a
lesser sentence, despite the fact that disorderly conduct was not a lesser-included offense of
the crimes originally charged. Id. at 1150-51.
237. Id. at 1151.
238. Id. at 1151-52.
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In New Jersey, before a judge-mandated ban on baseless pleas, 239
commentators who supported "215 pleas," 240 plea agreements frequently
used in New Jersey traffic courts that allowed "[m]otorists accused of
careless driving, speeding, and other moving violations [to] plead guilty to
violating an unrelated statute, known as '215,'241 argued that "plea
bargaining for traffic offenses was developed for good reason. '242 These
pleas were a necessary part of the municipal court system because they
"helped avoid huge court backlogs, police overtime costs, and heavy
penalties for otherwise law-obeying motorists. ' 243  Before the ban,
government officials warned that "eliminating [baseless] plea-bargaining
'has the potential of bringing the municipal court system to a halt [because]
the court will be backlogged forever.' "244 Even New Jerseyans who agreed
with the ban in principle cautioned that "without the plea bargains, many
more motorists will contest tickets, leading to crushing caseloads, increased
costs for police overtime, and packed courtrooms." 245
In response to the Iowa Supreme Court's decision to reprimand an
attorney for prosecuting baseless cowl-lamp pleas, 246 legal authorities in
Missouri decided to review the "long-standing practice throughout [their
own state] of reducing moving violations to defective-equipment pleas. '247
When the City Council in Kansas City discovered the prevalent use of these
pleas, they issued a temporary ban, which "created a huge backlog of
Municipal Court cases, potentially costing the city millions in lost
revenue." 248  In addition to expected complaints from judges and
239. See Michael Booth, Traffic-Court Plea-Bargain Bill Advances, 160 N.J. L.J. 1098,
1098 (2000) (reporting that the Administrative Office of Courts in New Jersey issued a
directive banning baseless pleas in municipal courts). The legislature in New Jersey
responded to the ban by enacting a new law that would allow defendants to plead to a
factually based charge while deriving the same benefits from the previously used baseless
"215 plea." See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-97.2 (West 2002) (making it "unlawful for any
person to drive or operate a motor vehicle in an unsafe manner likely to endanger a person or
property"); News Release, Office of the Governor Christie Whitman, Governor Christie
Whitman Today Signed the Following Legislation (July 24, 2000) (on file with author)
("The [unsafe driving] bill is a response to an April 24, 2000 directive by the Administrative
Office of the Courts clarifying that municipal prosecutors may not accept plea agreements
that downgrade traffic offenses unless a factual basis can be shown to support the lesser
offense.").
240. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-215 (penalizing "[a]ny person who fails to obey the
directions of a police officer or fails to obey the directional signals or signs provided").
241. Hughes & Kraut, supra note 13 (explaining that 215 pleas carried no points against a
driver's license and "should apply [for example] to a person who drives on Route 80 if the
road is closed because of flooding").
242. Editorial, Driver-Friendly Plea Deals: Don 't Scrap Them Just Because of Abuses,
REcORD (Bergen County, N.J.), May 4, 2000, at L10.
243. Id.
244. Hester, supra note 11 (quoting Assemblyman Christopher "Kip" Bateman, a
representative from Somerset, N.J., and a Bridgewater, N.J., prosecutor).
245. Hughes & Kraut, supra note 13.
246. See Iowa Supreme Court Att'y Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360 (Iowa
2005).
247. Mansur, supra note 79.
248. Campbell, supra note 10.
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prosecutors regarding resources and backlogs, defense attorneys argued that
barring these baseless pleas would clog already busy traffic courts and "cost
them money." 249 Even the Iowa press, which strongly criticized courts for
allowing baseless pleas, confessed that "[t]he reality, however, is court
officials don't have the resources to do the job. There are simply not
enough judges, prosecutors, courtrooms or hours in the day to prosecute
every case. So they make deals and cut corners." 250 Judges recognize that
this is a "troubling state of affairs .... but if the court system cannot handle
the number of cases coming to it, justice [inevitably] suffers." 251
3. Mutually Beneficial Plea Agreements Justify Baseless Pleas
A third justification offered in support of baseless pleas is that these pleas
achieve a mutually beneficial result for all the parties involved in a case and
therefore supplant the need for a factual basis. Judge Larson, the dissenting
voice on the Iowa bench, argued that DR 7-103(A), the disciplinary rule
requiring prosecutors to bring charges only with a factual basis, "was never
intended to provide a basis for disciplining a prosecutor under
circumstances such as these. '252 He claimed that this rule was intended to
discipline prosecutors for coercing guilty pleas by overcharging defendants,
so the ethical rule was not violated if it provided leniency to defendants by
charging them with less serious offenses.253
The New York Court of Appeals similarly found a "jurisdictional defect
was implicated when the defendant pleaded guilty to charges equal to or
higher than those for which he was indicted," but not when he pleaded to
lesser offenses, and especially not to misdemeanors. 254 In fact, the court
emphasized that courts are encouraged to accept plea bargains to afford
defendants leniency, even if there is no factual basis to support the plea,
because it also benefits the court's interest in efficiency.255
When asked about "215 pleas,"256 a municipal prosecutor in New Jersey
stated, "'[Y]ou're not there just to hammer someone, you're there to do
justice, and sometimes justice means people should get a break."'' 257
Another prosecutor echoed this sentiment by stating, "'If someone can
leave [the court] with a learning experience and a deterrent factor, saying "I
249. Mansur, supra note 79.
250. Editorial, Courtroom Corruption-Yes, in Iowa: Traffic Plea Bargains Are Legal
Extortion, DES MOrNES REG., Feb. 22, 2004, at OPI [hereinafter Courtroom Corruption].
251. Id.
252. Iowa Supreme Court Att'y Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360, 384 (Iowa
2005) (Larson, J., dissenting).
253. Id. (noting that the rule was also aimed to prevent prosecutors from filing criminal
charges to influence civil settlements).
254. People v. Keizer, 790 N.E.2d 1149, 1152 (N.Y. 2003).
255. Id. at 1151.
256. See supra note 240.
257. Hughes & Kraut, supra note 13 (quoting New Jersey municipal prosecutor Rosario
Presti).
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had to pay a fine," I think we've all done our job."'' 258 Some judges also
argue that courts are gaining some accountability and providing some form
of justice even if the means are not completely accurate. 259
A columnist in New Jersey also reported on the mutually beneficial
nature of baseless pleas: "The police are happy because their citations
stand, albeit watered down. The motorists are happy because they've
reduced their fines or limited damage to their driving records. And the
judges are happy because their already overburdened dockets aren't further
clogged with time-consuming trials." 260 Pat Caserta, former vice president
of the Passaic County Bar Association,261 though reluctantly admitting that
a ban on 215 pleas would be legally correct, asserted that "[t]here are a lot
of rules that are not enforced to the letter of the law .... This is a minor
thing, and who is complaining? No one." 262
B. Critics of Baseless Pleas Cite Criminal Justice Policy and Legal Ethics
Concerns
Though baseless pleas have received largely unquestioned support, a few
dissonant voices have emerged, arguing that baseless pleas raise criminal
justice policy and legal ethics concerns. One of the more prominent voices
is that of the Iowa Supreme Court, which condemned baseless pleas by
reprimanding Bradley Howe, a thirty-year Spencer City prosecutor, for
reducing moving traffic violations to cowl-lamp violations without factual
bases to support the pleas.263 In addition to the ethics concern raised by the
Iowa Supreme Court that baseless pleas violate prosecutors' probable cause
requirement, other commentators have argued that baseless pleas weaken
deterrence, threaten public safety, and undermine the integrity of the courts.
1. Criminal Justice Policy Concerns
a. Baseless Pleas Weaken Deterrence
The first criminal justice policy argument in opposition to baseless pleas
maintains that such pleas weaken the connection of specific crimes with
punishment and, therefore, diminish the overall deterrent effect of the
criminal law. Commentators have noted that "[t]he utility of the criminal
sanction, in terms of deterrence, is contingent upon the actual culpability of
the individual on whom it is imposed" 264 because "' [t]he more accurate the
258. Id. (quoting prosecutor Philip Tometta from Bergen County, N.J.).
259. See Clouse, supra note 1.
260. Hester, supra note 11.
261. See Passaic County Bar Association, PCBA Officers, http://www.passaicbar.org/
officers.php (last visited Apr. 19, 2010).
262. Hughes & Kraut, supra note 13.
263. See Iowa Supreme Court Att'y Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360, 367-68
(Iowa 2005).
264. Talia Fisher & Issachar Rosen-Zvi, The Confessional Penalty, 30 CARDozo L. REV.
871, 906 (2008).
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process of determining guilt is, the less random punishment will be, and so
the greater will be the law's deterrent effect."'' 265  The Pennsylvania
Department of Transportation (PennDOT), in arguing against baseless
"failing to obey a traffic control device" pleas, 266 stated that "[w]hen courts
and police cut deals, they tacitly encourage bad driving behaviors, such as
speeding, and turn a dangerous habit into a penalty akin to double
parking." 267
Presiding Municipal Judge Joe Locascio from Kansas City expressed a
similar concern "that, because of this [baseless plea] policy, people are
undeterred from violating the city's traffic code. '268 In Kansas City alone,
over 30,000 moving violations are pled down to baseless charges every
year, 269 and "[p]roblem drivers keep on speeding, even when their licenses
should be suspended or revoked" because there is no consequence for
violating the traffic laws. 270
Insurance companies and law enforcement officials in New Jersey, where
the well-known "215 plea" was banned, 271 stated that "215 deals allowed
poor drivers to continue their unsafe habits without fear of losing their
license or paying higher insurance rates. '272  A spokesman for the
Insurance Council of New Jersey said that "[f]rom a broader public policy
standpoint, we're concerned that it becomes very difficult to detect and
track high-risk drivers" who will stay on the road because they can plead to
baseless charges and avoid penalties. 273
b. Baseless Pleas Threaten Public Safety
A second policy argument that results from weakened deterrence is that
baseless pleas threaten public safety. In researching Pennsylvania's
baseless defective equipment pleas, PennDOT found that "diverting more
and more speeders . . . into the no-points catchall. . . . allow[ed] risky
drivers to remain on the road for a sustained time with a 'clean' driving
record. '274 The traffic data made available to the public is based on
convictions, so drivers who have entered baseless pleas have inaccurate
265. Henrik Lando, Does Wrongful Conviction Lower Deterrence?, 35 J. LEGAL STUD.
327, 328 (2006) (quoting Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of
Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1477, 1484 (1999)).
266. These pleas are similar to New Jersey's former "215 pleas." See supra note 240 and
accompanying text.
267. Harry Yanoshak, Beating the Speeding Ticket, INTELLIGENCER (Doylestown, Pa.),
July 11, 2004, at 1A (quoting Rebecca Bickley, PennDOT's director of driver licensing).
268. Mansur, supra note 36.
269. See id.
270. Id.
271. See supra note 239.
272. Hughes & Kraut, supra note 13.
273. Id.
274. Yanoshak, supra note 267.
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driving records, and law enforcement officials are then less able to protect
against them. 275
In Kansas City, "bad drivers were allowed to repeatedly reduce speeding
or other moving violations to a guilty plea to having defective
equipment. ' 276  Safety advocates in Missouri say that "the practice
theoretically allowed dangerous drivers to get away with bad behavior,
causing danger to others." 277 Even "[s]erious violations-such as DUIs,
racing on city streets, leaving the scene of an accident and fleeing the
police-also were pleaded down to 'defective equipment,' ' 278 and in fact
"only .00169 percent of the defective-equipment pleas in the Municipal
Court ... were based on fact. '279 In 2005, one in every four tickets was
baselessly pled down to defective equipment, such that "more than 30,000
moving violations a year in Kansas City simply disappear[ed]." 280  The
number of pleas and the effect of "'[a]llowing people who are found to be
driving under the influence or fleeing the scene of an accident puts it to a
level of a crisis in our judicial system."' 281
Reporters from The Des Moines Register, a newspaper that closely
covered the disciplinary proceedings against attorneys who negotiated
cowl-lamp pleas in Iowa, stated that, among other things, there were two
"things wrong with this [practice]: .. .It is a lie . . .[and i]t undermines
public safety. '282 Recipients of plea bargains to cowl-lamp or defective
equipment charges in Iowa were often "reckless drivers getting off the hook
and back on the road" by confessing to violations for owning auto parts
they had never even heard of.2 83
2. Ethics Concerns
a. Baseless Pleas Violate Prosecutors' Obligation To Bring Charges
Supported by Probable Cause
In addition to these criminal justice policy concerns, authorities have
brought forth two primary ethical concerns with the practice of baseless
pleas. The earliest ethics concern was posited by the Iowa Supreme Court,
which held that city prosecutor Bradley Howe clearly violated DR 7-
275. Id. (suggesting that the traffic data in eighteen magisterial districts in Bucks County
and thirty districts in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, are inaccurate because of baseless
plea bargains entered in traffic court).
276. Campbell, supra note 10.
277. Id.
278. Mansur, supra note 79.
279. Id.
280. Mansur, supra note 36.
281. Mansur, supra note 79 (quoting Steve Glorioso, an aide to Mayor Kay Barnes).
282. Courtroom Corruption, supra note 250 (reporting that baseless pleas are a form of
"courtroom corruption" and "legal extortion").
283. Id.
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103(A),284 prohibiting prosecutors from instituting charges they know lack
probable cause, by charging and prosecuting defendants for violations of
the cowl-lamp statute when he knew vehicles have not been equipped with
cowl lamps "for a considerable number of years." 285 The court also made
clear that the "fact that plea bargains to lesser or related charges are
authorized by our rules of criminal procedure" and the fact that all the
parties involved acquiesced in the plea agreement was "irrelevant" to the
prosecutor's ethical obligation.286 They argued the unqualified rule "DR 7-
103(A) means what it says: prosecutors cannot ethically file charges they
know lack probable cause." 287
An earlier Iowa ethics opinion made the same argument, namely, that
"[i]t is improper for a prosecuting lawyer and for a defendant's lawyer to
enter into a plea agreement under which a prosecutor files charges that are
not supported by underlying facts [even if] the defendant agrees to
plead." 288 Likewise, Missouri's legal ethics counselor, despite supporting
the use of baseless pleas, confessed that "[Missouri] state court rules
prohibit a prosecution based on a falsehood, which ... is essentially what
happens in a [baseless] defective-equipment plea."289
b. Baseless Pleas Threaten the Integrity of Court
A second ethical argument made against the use of baseless pleas is that
they undermine the integrity of the court. When the New Jersey
Administrative Office of the Courts issued a directive that barred municipal
courts from accepting plea agreements that downgraded traffic offenses
unless a factual basis could be shown for the plea,290 they did so "to
'eliminate practices in some municipal courts that threaten the integrity of
284. Iowa Supreme Court Att'y Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360, 368 & n.3
(Iowa 2005) (stating that the "'prosecutor in a criminal case shall . . . refrain from
prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause"' and
"'shall not institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when the lawyer knows or it is
obvious that the charges are not supported by probable cause' (omission in original)
(quoting IOWA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 32:3.8(a); IOWA CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY
DR 7-103(A))).
285. Id. at 367.
286. Id. at 368. The court distinguished between the prosecutor's ethical duty to have a
factual basis for the charge in the original indictment and the need for a factual basis for the
offense in the ultimate plea agreement, and chose not to consider "whether guilty pleas to
non-moving traffic violations require a factual basis or whether a court accepting such pleas
must ascertain whether a factual basis exists [when the charge in the indictment is supported
by a factual basis]." Id. at 368 n.4.
287. Id. at 371. Though not part of the holding of the case, the Iowa court also stated that
allowing defendants to plead guilty to crimes with no factual basis was an improper use of
prosecutorial discretion. Id. at 370-71 (quoting CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS § 13.10.3, at 762 (Practitioner's ed. 1986)).
288. Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof'l Ethics and Conduct, Op. 87-13 (1988), available
at http://www.iowabar.org/ethics.nsf/e61beed77a2l5f6686256497004ce492/c5ef81 db0977
0e05862564c3004d874d!OpenDocument.
289. Mansur, supra note 79.
290. See Booth, supra note 239, at 1098.
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the plea agreement process."' 291 Judge Richard Williams, who promoted
the ban, argued that the integrity of the judiciary was being compromised
"when motorists swore under oath that they committed acts that had no
basis in reality. '292 He argued that "'it is very important for people to have
confidence in the court system and to recognize the system is working the
way it is supposed to work and that it is fair .... There has to be a factual
basis for downgrading charges."' 293
The Iowa Supreme Court, addressing Prosecutor Howe's filing of cowl-
lamp violations without factual bases, similarly stated,
[W]hen charges are filed that are known to all to be bogus and guilty
pleas to those charges are accepted in order to allow defendants to escape
the adverse consequences of the offenses they actually committed, there
can be only one result: respect for the court system is diminished and the
public's confidence in the integrity of the criminal justice system is
seriously undermined. While the disposition of a traffic offense in the
manner employed here may be the expedient way to dispose of a citation
to the satisfaction of the parties involved, it sends the wrong message to
the public. It makes a mockery of the justice system when a defendant is
punished for violating a statute that he unquestionably did not violate. 294
The general sentiments of authorities against this practice echo that of an
Iowa citizen who said, "These deals should end. Now. Prosecutors who
continue to cut deals by making people lie should be removed. Judges
should scrutinize plea bargains more closely. And, state officials should
find out just how far this spreads." 295
III. JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS CANNOT ETHICALLY PARTICIPATE IN
BASELESS PLEAS
Part III, acknowledging the legitimacy of the criminal justice policy
concerns regarding baseless pleas, evaluates the ethical concerns raised by
critics of the pleas, as discussed in Part II, and applies the ethics
background discussed in Part I to assess baseless pleas in light of
prosecutors' and judges' ethical obligations.296 Though the Iowa Supreme
Court properly found baseless pleas unethical under the probable cause rule,
its conclusion was not based on the most compelling ethical grounds. Part
291. Id.
292. Editorial, Plea Bargaining Traffic Tickets / Good Solution, PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY,
July 27, 2000, at Ai 0 [hereinafter Good Solution].
293. Hester, supra note 11 (quoting Winnie Comfort, a spokeswoman for the New Jersey
courts).
294. Iowa Supreme Court Att'y Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360, 379 (Iowa
2005). Note, however, that this was unrelated to the court's holding, which was based solely
on the violation of the prosecutor's probable cause obligation. Id. at 371.
295. Courtroom Corruption, supra note 250.
296. Although not analyzed in this Note, baseless pleas also raise separation of powers
concerns. While the practice may not necessarily establish a constitutional violation, the
practice may impede some of the doctrines of a tripartite democracy. See supra notes 18, 28
(referencing the legislature's responsibility to define crimes and the separation of powers
doctrine as related to defining and adjudicating criminal law).
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III.A therefore attends to the Iowa court's argument that baseless pleas are
inconsistent with legal ethics because the practice contravenes prosecutors'
obligation to bring charges supported by probable cause. Following this,
however, Part III.B discusses the more substantial ethical interest
implicated by baseless pleas-the integrity of the courts and criminal
process-raised by the New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts.
Part III.B first explains how baseless pleas undermine the integrity of the
courts and legal profession by institutionalizing deceit in the criminal
justice system and defrauding the public. Next, Part III.B argues that
baseless pleas challenge the fairness of the criminal process by allowing
judges to decide cases in contradiction to the facts and allowing prosecutors
to knowingly secure wrongful convictions. Part III notes that although
defense counsel also have an ethical duty to avoid deceit, they do not have
as clear an obligation to prevent the use of baseless pleas because of their
unique role in the criminal process. Part III concludes that, regardless of
the interests in efficiency and leniency, judges and prosecutors cannot
participate in baseless pleas because these pleas violate judges' and
prosecutors' ethical obligations. Finally, this part proposes both an
amendment to the probable cause rule, as found in Model Rule 3.8(a), to
clarify a prosecutor's probable cause obligation and the adoption of
prosecutorial and judicial policies that explicitly prohibit baseless pleas.
A. Prosecutors Violate the Probable Cause Rule by Participating in
Baseless Pleas
As the Iowa Supreme Court held, prosecutors violate the ethical
obligation to bring charges supported by probable cause when they
negotiate baseless pleas.297 Prosecutors are obligated under Model Rule
3.8(a), adopted in nearly every state, 298 to "refrain from prosecuting a
charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause. '299
The Iowa court correctly found, therefore, that Prosecutor Howe violated
the probable cause requirement by charging violations of the cowl-lamp
statute when Howe knew there was no factual basis to support the
charges. 300 Prosecutors like Howe who change charges in an indictment to
offenses unsupported by probable cause clearly violate the ethical
obligation of Rule 3.8(a) because this directly contradicts the wording of
the rule. 30 1
Although the Iowa court limited its analysis to the aforementioned
situation,30 2 the probable cause requirement of Rule 3.8(a) is also violated
in situations where the offenses charged in the indictment are supported by
probable cause but the offenses to which the defendant actually pleads are
297. See supra notes 284-87 and accompanying text.
298. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
299. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2009).
300. See supra notes 284-85 and accompanying text.
301. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
302. See supra note 286.
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without a factual basis. The probable cause requirement "carries with it
specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice
and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence. ' 303 The
prosecutor's duty under Rule 3.8(a) therefore includes a duty not to charge
without probable cause and, additionally, not to allow convictions that are
without a factual basis.304 As the comment to Rule 3.8 specifies, the
probable cause requirement was created to ensure that a defendant's guilt is
based on sufficient facts. 30 5 When a prosecutor negotiates a plea to a crime
that the prosecutor knows is without a factual basis-however documented
in the charging instrument-the prosecutor is allowing a decision to be
made on the defendant's guilt without a sufficient factual basis, which
violates the purpose of the probable cause rule. Baseless pleas, therefore,
are a violation of the prosecutor's ethical obligation to prosecute charges
only where supported by probable cause.
B. Baseless Pleas Undermine the Integrity of the Court, Legal Profession,
and Criminal Proceeding
While the Iowa court arrived at the proper conclusion that baseless pleas
violate legal ethics obligations, 30 6 it neither based its decision on the most
compelling grounds nor addressed all those involved in a criminal case who
should be ethically obligated to avoid baseless pleas. The more persuasive
reasoning against baseless pleas is that the practice challenges the
legitimacy of the criminal justice system, both by undermining the integrity
of the courts and legal profession and by subverting the fairness of criminal
proceedings. Additionally, because both prosecutors and judges are
responsible for carrying out the administration of justice, they violate their
ethical obligations by participating in baseless pleas.
1. Baseless Pleas Undermine the Integrity of the Court and Legal
Profession
Prosecutors, as ministers of justice,307 and judges, as administrators of
the justice system, 30 8 have an obligation to uphold the integrity of the court
and the legal profession. 309 Prosecutors meet this obligation by maintaining
their duties of candor toward the court, truthfulness to third parties, and
truth-seeking. 310 Judges fulfill this obligation by maintaining the public's
confidence in judicial integrity and properly regulating the bar.311 By
303. United States v. Chu, 5 F.3d 1244, 1249 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. (1984)).
304. See supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
306. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
307. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
309. See supra Part I.B.1, 3.
310. See supra Part I.B.1.
311. See supra Part I.B.3.a-b.
20101 2997
FORDHAMLA WREVIEW
entering baseless pleas, however, prosecutors and judges contravene their
ethical obligations and violate their duty to uphold the integrity of the
courts and the legal profession.
a. Prosecutors' Participation in Baseless Pleas Undermines the Integrity of
the Court and the Legal Profession
Prosecutors' truth-seeking duty 312 includes obligations to seek factually
supported convictions, to act with candor toward the tribunal, and to be
truthful to third parties. 313 In negotiating pleas to crimes that they know
have no basis in fact, prosecutors are making misrepresentations to the
court, defrauding the public, and ultimately derogating the truth-seeking
process, which degrades the integrity of the court and legal profession.
Prosecutors have a duty of candor toward the tribunal that prohibits them
from knowingly making false statements to the court, bans submission of
false evidence, and requires them to take remedial measures to make
falsities known to the court.314 Pursuant to the probable cause requirement,
the prosecutor may only prosecute charges supported by a factual basis.3 15
Therefore, in submitting a plea agreement to the court, the prosecutor is
asserting that there is a factual basis for the offense to which the defendant
is pleading. The defendant's voluntary guilty plea, which is taken as a
factual admission of guilt, is used as the evidence to support the
conviction. 316 In a baseless plea, the prosecutor knows there is no factual
basis for the offense being pled to, yet submits the plea to the court, thereby
making a false representation to the court. In addition, by encouraging the
defendant to accept a baseless plea and make what the prosecutor knows is
a fraudulent admission of guilt to the court, the prosecutor is submitting
false evidence in the form of the defendant's confession to obtain a
conviction. Lastly, by offering the baseless plea and allowing the defendant
to plead guilty knowing that the plea is fraudulent, 317 the prosecutor is
violating the obligation to take remedial measures to remedy what the
prosecutor knows is false evidence and a misrepresentation. These are
clearly violations of the duty of candor to the tribunal.
The fact that judges are aware of the falsities does not justify the
prosecutor's use of them. Proponents of baseless pleas may argue that,
similar to other forms of deception allowed in criminal proceedings, 318
baseless pleas do not violate the duty of candor toward the tribunal because
the court knows there is no factual basis for the offense and acquiesces in
the defendant's plea. The baseless plea situation, however, is
distinguishable from other circumstances where prosecutors are justified in
312. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
314. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
315. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
316. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
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engaging in deceptive conduct. In other circumstances, such as the use of
undercover investigators or wiretaps, the deception is used to expose
criminal activity, such as corruption, that would otherwise be difficult to
investigate for the purpose of realizing justice. 319  In a baseless plea,
however, the deception is not used to further justice or expose corruption,
but rather for the sake of expedience, 320 often at the cost of generating
corruption. 321 Further, while other forms of permissibly deceptive conduct
are eventually exposed, 322 the deception in baseless pleas stays concealed
even after the conviction is made. 323 Therefore, though prosecutors can
ethically engage in deception in certain circumstances for law enforcement
purposes, 324 baseless pleas are not one of those instances.
In addition to the duty of candor toward the tribunal, prosecutors have a
duty of truthfulness to third parties 325 that is violated by participating in
baseless pleas. The obligation of truthfulness toward third parties,
illustrated by Rule 4.1, which prohibits lawyers from making false
statements of material fact to third persons,326 and Rule 8.4, which prohibits
engaging in deceitful or fraudulent conduct,327 includes a duty to avoid
knowingly making misrepresentations to "downstream users." 328  In
negotiating baseless pleas, prosecutors violate this duty by securing
fraudulent convictions that result in false criminal records, which in turn
defraud downstream users, such as the auto insurance company and the
department of motor vehicles, which rely on convictions to determine
insurance rates or to add points to defendants' licenses 329-not to mention
the employer, lender, and probation officer, who will all rely on the
prosecutor's representation that the defendant had a broken taillight instead
of a DUI.330
In addition to the duties of candor toward the court and third parties that
are required by the ethical rules,331 prosecutors have a professional ethos to
seek justice, and in carrying out justice, to seek truth.332 This truth-seeking
duty is clearly illustrated by the ethical values and relevant rules that guide
prosecutorial practice. The duties to charge only with probable cause, to
prosecute only with sufficient evidence, to provide the defense with
exculpatory evidence, and to remedy wrongful convictions all reinforce the
basic premise that prosecutors have a duty to seek the truth, not simply to
319. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
320. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
321. See supra note 282.
322. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 274-83 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
327. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
329. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
330. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 134, 138 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
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secure convictions. 333 Baseless pleas derogate this truth-seeking process.
The prosecutor, in offering a baseless plea agreement, knows that the
defendant did not commit the crimes to which the defendant is pleading.
This is not only a failure to seek truth, but an effort to hide it. When
prosecutors fail to represent the public's interest in seeking truth, they
undermine public trust in the integrity of the courts and the legal
profession. 334
b. Judges' Participation in Baseless Pleas Undermines the Integrity of the
Court and the Legal Profession
Judges, as overseers of the administration of justice, have a foremost duty
to promote public confidence in the legitimacy of the justice system335 and,
with this, the obligation to uphold the integrity of the courts and to properly
regulate the bar toward that end. 336 By accepting guilty pleas to crimes
judges know are without factual basis and allowing prosecutors to negotiate
these baseless pleas in violation of legal ethics, judges denigrate the
integrity of the court and fail to properly regulate the bar.
Judges promote public confidence in the integrity of the courts by
upholding the integrity of the judiciary, which requires at a minimum that
judges obey the law, 337 follow both procedural and ethical rules, and
maintain the ethical standard expected of other members of the bar.338
First, where criminal procedure rules require that judges determine the
factual basis for the charges to which a defendant is pleading guilty,339
judges are violating the law by accepting guilty pleas when they know the
offenses charged have no basis in fact. Though the methods used to
determine a factual basis may vary by jurisdiction,340 judges in these
jurisdictions cannot accept a plea without inquiring into the factual basis
and, accordingly, cannot accept a plea they know has no factual basis. 341
Therefore, judges who are required to establish a factual basis for a guilty
plea, but nonetheless knowingly accept baseless pleas, violate the
procedural rules. This practice casts doubt on their credibility because
"judges themselves must obey the law in order to credibly adjudicate
allegedly unlawful conduct [of the public]. '342
Second, judicial ethics demand that judges conduct themselves with the
highest level of integrity to promote public confidence in the judiciary and
333. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
336. See supra Part I.B.3.
337. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
338. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
340. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
341. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
342. Pingree, supra note 189, at 1114.
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in the legitimacy of the courts. 343 Judges are held to a higher ethical
standard, which includes the obligations of the rules of professional
responsibility governing lawyers. 344 If lawyers have an obligation to avoid
deceitful conduct that defrauds downstream users,345 then judges have no
less an obligation. In accepting baseless pleas, judges issue convictions for
crimes they know were not committed, which defrauds the public and
downstream users in violation of judges' ethical duties. In the same way
that the prosecutor is obligated not to facilitate fraudulent convictions
because of her duty to the insurance company, employer, and others, the
judge who accepts a baseless plea for defective equipment rather than a
DUI is also responsible to those who rely on the resulting convictions. 346
In addition to diminishing the integrity of the courts, judges also weaken
public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession by allowing
prosecutors and defense attorneys to negotiate baseless pleas in violation of
legal ethics. Judges are responsible for the ethical conduct of the attorneys
they admit to practice law, 347 and especially for the conduct of those
practicing in their courts. 348 When judges allow prosecutors and defense
attorneys to negotiate baseless pleas, they encourage lawyers to make
misrepresentations to the court and empower them to assist defendants in
doing so. Judges also allow attorneys to deceive downstream users and the
public who rely on the fraudulent convictions that result from baseless
pleas. Specifically with regard to prosecutors, by allowing baseless pleas,
judges are also sanctioning prosecutors' violation of the probable cause
requirement. Therefore, in allowing prosecutors and defense attorneys to
negotiate baseless pleas, judges promote the violation of ethical obligations,
which is an obvious failure to properly regulate the bar.
2. Baseless Pleas Undermine the Fairness of Criminal Proceedings
In addition to undermining the integrity of the courts and the legal
profession, baseless pleas also undercut the integrity of the criminal
process-the fairness and accuracy of criminal proceedings. Prosecutors
have a duty to seek justice, 349 and judges have a duty, in the interest of
justice, to ensure that defendants are afforded a fair process. 350 Baseless
pleas, however, contradict these basic duties to seek justice and ensure
fairness by allowing prosecutors and judges to knowingly convict
defendants of crimes for which they are not guilty, thereby foregoing justice
and fair proceedings in favor of expedient convictions.
343. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 131-32.
346. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
347. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
348. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
349. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
350. See supra Part I.B.3.c.
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a. Baseless Pleas Permit Prosecutors To Secure Wrongful Convictions
Prosecutors, by facilitating baseless pleas, defy their duty to seek justice
by purposefully convicting defendants of crimes they did not commit.
Prosecutors have an ethical duty to protect the innocent from wrongful
convictions. 351 This duty is reflected in the numerous obligations created to
ensure prosecutors prevent and rectify wrongful convictions, including
duties to charge only with probable cause, 352 to prosecute only with
sufficient evidence, 353 to provide the defense with exculpatory evidence, 354
and to remedy wrongful convictions when exculpatory evidence is
discovered. 355 With the abundance of safeguards to prevent and remedy
wrongful convictions, prosecutors surely cannot be ethically allowed to
intentionally convict people of crimes the prosecutor knows they did not
commit, 356 which is essentially what occurs in a baseless plea. Even if the
defendant agrees to the wrongful conviction, the prosecutor is not exempt
from her ethical obligation to prevent such a conviction.357 The prosecutor
"'represents all the people and has no responsibility except fairly to
discharge his duty,' ' 358 which can "never be promoted by the conviction of
the innocent. ' 359 However, when a prosecutor negotiates a baseless plea,
she is circumventing her duty to the people and dismissing her
responsibility to seek justice by knowingly convicting the defendant of a
crime for which the defendant is innocent.360 Regardless of the benefit of
leniency to or the consent of the defendant, 361 by entering a baseless plea,
the prosecutor is knowingly making a wrongful conviction. This is
antithetical to the prosecutor's ethical obligations and prosecutorial role,
and exposes the failure of the criminal justice system to provide fair and
just proceedings. 362
b. Baseless Pleas Violate Judges' Duty To Ensure Fair Proceedings
Judges, by accepting baseless pleas, violate their duty to ensure the
fairness of criminal proceedings by entering judgments they know are in
conflict with the facts of the case. Judges have a duty to defendants and to
the public to ensure that criminal proceedings result in the "fair and
accurate resolution of the question of guilt or innocence." 363 In carrying
351. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
352. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
353. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
354. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
355. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
357. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
358. Hosford v. State, 525 So. 2d 789, 792 (Miss. 1988) (quoting Adams v. State, 30 So.
2d 593, 596 (Miss. 1947)).
359. Hurd v. People, 25 Mich. 405, 416 (1872).
360. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
361. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
362. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
363. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975).
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out this duty, judges are granted the authority to create procedural
safeguards 364 to supervise the plea bargaining process and are afforded
broad discretion in accepting plea agreements 365 to ensure that convictions
are based on honest appraisals of the facts. 366 When judges accept baseless
pleas, however, they are deciding cases in knowing contradiction to the
facts, 367 and often in opposition to the procedural rules requiring a factual
basis. 368  Therefore, in accepting baseless pleas, judges disregard their
obligation to reject unsupported pleas and fail to protect defendants' and the
public's interests in fair criminal proceedings. 369
Defense attorneys, though also subject to ethical rules, have the primary
role of zealous advocate, 370 and thus a principal duty to achieve the best
result for their clients. 371  Therefore, while defense attorneys have an
obligation of candor to the court372 and the public, 373 they do not have a
comparable duty to prosecutors to seek justice or uncover truth,374 and
therefore do not have a similarly clear or compelling ethical duty to avoid
baseless pleas. 375 Despite interests in judicial efficiency and in providing
defendants leniency, judges and prosecutors cannot justify the use of
baseless pleas that not only raise ethical concerns, but also run in direct
opposition to the justice system's core ethical values. These values require
judges and prosecutors to uphold integrity, discover truth, and administer
justice. Baseless pleas, however, weaken integrity, hide truth, and
circumvent justice. Therefore, these pleas cannot be condoned, much less
encouraged, by judges and prosecutors.
C. Proposals To End the Unethical Use of Baseless Pleas
Although adherence to currently existing ethics standards prohibit
prosecutors and judges from participating in baseless pleas, an amendment
to the current probable cause rule and the adoption of prosecutorial and
judicial policies that clarify court officers' ethical obligations may better
prevent the use of baseless pleas and encourage prosecutors and judges to
fulfill their ethical obligations. Rather than imposing sanctions, this Note
argues that a simple clarification of already existing ethical responsibilities
may adequately resolve this ethical issue.
364. See supra notes 219-26 and accompanying text.
365. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 212, 217 and accompanying text.
367. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 219-26 and accompanying text.
369. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
370. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
371. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
372. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
373. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
374. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 163, 166 and accompanying text.
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To clarify prosecutors' ethical duty and inhibit the use of baseless plea
bargains, Model Rule 3.8(a), the probable cause rule, 376 and the correlated
state prosecutorial ethics rules should be amended to set a higher bar for
initiating and maintaining criminal prosecutions. The rule should be
modified to reflect the general consensus that a prosecutor should file "only
those charges which he reasonably believes can be substantiated by
admissible evidence at trial. '377 The model rule should, therefore, be
changed from its current phrasing that prosecutors shall "refrain from
prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable
cause" 378 to instead state the following:
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall not ... [qile in court or maintain a
charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause...
[nor p]rosecute a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by
evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of guilt . . .
[because a] prosecutor has the responsibility .... to see that the defendant
is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of
sufficient evidence. 379
That language would clarify that prosecutors are prohibited not only from
initiating charges unsupported by probable cause, but also from continuing
to prosecute a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by a
factual basis. This would resolve the issue left unaddressed by the Iowa
Supreme Court380 by specifying that prosecutors cannot allow defendants to
plead guilty to crimes with no factual basis, regardless of whether the
offense documented in the charging instrument is supported by probable
cause.
In addition to amending the probable cause rule, state attorneys general's
offices and court administrative offices should adopt policies, similar to the
one implemented by the New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts,
which "bar[s] courts from accepting plea agreements . . . unless a factual
basis could be shown for the plea."381 By adopting and adhering to policies
that bar baseless pleas, prosecutors and judges uphold their ethical
obligations and leave the criminal justice policy concerns to be addressed
by the legislature382 that may, as the legislature did in New Jersey, create
new statutes to allow defendants to plead to factually based offenses while
deriving similar benefits of expedience and leniency.383
376. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2009).
377. NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS Standard 43.3 (Nat'l Dist. Att'ys Ass'n, 2d ed.
1991).
378. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) & cmt.
379. This wording is taken from the probable cause rule adopted by the District of
Columbia. See supra note 123.
380. See supra note 286.
381. Booth, supra note 239.
382. See supra note 239.
383. See supra note 239.
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CONCLUSION
Prosecutors and judges have a responsibility to the public to ensure the
integrity of the courts and criminal process, which are essential to
maintaining the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. Yet, when they
knowingly allow defendants to plead guilty to "bogus" charges, "respect for
the court system is diminished and the public's confidence in the integrity
of the criminal justice system is seriously undermined." 384 So while courts
and practitioners continue to exploit baseless pleas in the name of
efficiency, they do so at the cost of their own integrity and that of the
justice system. It is time to end the "mockery" 385 and end the use of
baseless pleas.
384. Iowa Supreme Court Att'y Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360, 379 (Iowa
2005).
385. Id.
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